Part IV. Individual behavior and collective action

17 When is it rational to vote, J.H.Aldrich

18 Voting behavior, M.P.Fiorina

19 Public choice experiments, E.Hoffman

Part V. Public choice in action

20 Modern bureaucratic theory, R.Wintrobe

21 The positive theory of public bureaucracy, T.M.Moe

22 The political economy of taxation, W.Hettich, S.L.Winer

23 Rent seeking, R.D.Tollison

24 Endogenous protection: The empirical evidence, S.P.Mage

25 Why does government's share of national income grow?An assessment of the recent literature on the U.S. experience, C.M.Holsey, T.E.Borcherding

 

2.2. The Elgar Companion to Public Choice. Ed. by W. Shughrat II and L. Rarrolini. Cheltenhain.2001

 

Part I. Methodology

1 The old and new public choice: Chicago versus Virginia. W.C.Mitchell

2 Property rights: private and political institutions. L. de Alessi

3 The logic of collective action. O.Azfar

4 Social choice theory. M.J.G.Cain

Part II. The constitutional framework

5 Constitutional choice. G.Brennan, A,Hamilton

6 Monarchies, hereditary and non-hereditary. G.Tallock

7 The anatomy of political representation: direct democracy, parliamentary democracy, and representative democracy. T.R. Sass

Part III. Institutional mechanism of collective choice

8 Institutions, durability, and the value of political transactions. W.M.Crain

9 Voting. M.C.Munger

10 On legislatures and legislative efficiency wages. R.E. McCormick, C.S.Turner

11 Bureaucracy. W.A.Niskanen

12 Rational choice theories of bureaucratic control and performance. K.H. Chang, R.J.P. de Figueiredo,Jr., B.R.Weingast

13 The judiciary. G.M.Anderson

14 Money. K.B.Grier

15 Ideology. P.H.Rubin

16 Clubs and club goods. G.M.Anderson, W.F.Shughart, R.D.Tollison

Part IV. Public Choice perspectives on government and the economy

17 The interest-group theory of government. R.B.Eklund,Jr., R.D.Tollison

Rent seeking and rent extraction. F.S.McChesney

19 Public choice and public finance. R.G.Halcombe

20 Politics and the macro economy. R.E.Wagner

21 Monetary policy. M.Toma

22 The politics of government growth. R.D.Congleton

23 Is trust in government compatible with trustworthy government? D.R.Lee, J.R.Clark

Part V. The Public Choice revolution

24 Public choice as an experimental science. L.R.Anderson

25 The public choice approach to economic history. R.E.Ekelund,Jr., A.B.Davidson

26 Law and economics. B.L.Benson

27 Public choice and the environment. B.Yandle

28 Institutions, policy, and economic growth. G.W.Scully

29 Public choice and economic growth. R.G.Halcombe

30 The international economy in public choice perspective. C.K.Rowley

Приложение 3.

Курсы по теории общественного выбора 90-х годов

Joe McGarrirty (GMU)

Section one: Basic Theory

1. Introduction and Econometrics Review

2. Constitutional Political Economy

3. Voting

a. The Rationality of voting

b. Majority Rule

c. Median voter

d. Cycles

e. Proportional representation

f. Preference indications: Logrolling and exit & voice

g. Political parties

Section two: The interest group theory of government

4. The Interest group theory

5. Interest groups

6. Case studies

7. The role of institutions in promoting wealth transfers

8. Congress' wealth transfers and the principle agent

a. Bureaucracy

b. Special topic: competing bureaucracies

9. The Role of the executive in the wealth transfer process

10. Congressional wealth transfers

11. Rent Seeking

12. Explanations for congressional votes that can not be explained by the interest group theory

a. Ideology

b. Legislator Investment

Peter Boettke (GMU)

1. Introduction to the course

2. The Public Choice paradigm

3. A Public choice analysis of voting

4. Alternative institutions of voting

5. Representative Democracy

6. Bureaucratic Decision-Making

7. Rent-seeking Theory and Evidence

8. Spring Break

9. The Growth of Government

10. Industry Studies of Regulation

11. Public Choice and Macroeconomics

12. Normative Public Choice

13. Comparative Political Economy

Bryan Caplan (GMU)

1: Public Goods, Externalities, and Comparative Institutions

2: The Logic of Collective Action

3: The Median Voter Model

4: Rational Ignorance and the "Miracle of Aggregation"

5: Efficiency and Bargaining

6: Basics of Public Opinion and Voter Motivation

7: Empirical Accuracy of the Median Voter Model

8: Division of Powers, Special Interests, and Rent-Seeking

9: Political Competition and Political Collusion

10-11: Wittman's Myth of Democratic Failure

12: Expressive Voting

13: Systematic Bias Versus the Miracle of Aggregation

14-15: Democracy, Dictatorship, and Markets

3.4. Francisco C. Rodríguez (UMD)

Theory of Public Choice I:

Growth, Distribution and Politics1. The Median Voter Model

0. Introduction to the study of political economy

Part I: Visions of Politics

1. The Median Voter Model

2. Special Interests, Political Contributions and Asymmetries in political power.

3. Endogenous Property Rights

4. Endogenous Preferences and Ideology

Part II: Visions of Growth

5. Steady State Growth Theory

6. Endogenous Growtha.

AK and Spillover Modelsb.

Human Capitalc.

Diffusion and Innovation

7. Scale Effects and Size of Market

8. International Trade and Economic Growth

9. Natural Resources and Economic Growth

10. Institutions, Development and Growth

11. The Empirical Convergence Debates

12. Productivity and Technological Change

Part III: Inequality and Redistribution

13. Theories of the Formation of Inequality

14. Exploitation

15. Theories of Justice

16. Why is there Redistribution?

Part IV: The Political Economy of Growth: The Long Run

16. Inequality and Growth in the Median Voter Model

17. Inequality, Redistribution and Rent-Seeking

18. Growth with Endogenous Property Rights

19. Inefficient Government and Corruption

Part V: The Political Economy of Growth: The Short and Medium Runs

20. Stabilization

21. Trade Policy and Trade Liberalization

22. Policies for Human Capital Accumulation