Part I. Origins of the State

2. The reason for collective choice – allocative efficiency

3. Allocative efficiency or redistribution

Part II. Public Choice in a direct democracy

4. The choice of voting rule

5. Majority rule - positive properties

6. Majority rule – normative properties

7. Simple alternative to majority rule

8. Complicated alternative to majority rule

9. Exit, voice, and disloyalty

Part III. Public Choice in a representative democracy

10. Two-party competition – deterministic voting

11. Two-party competition – probabilistic voting

12. Multiparty systems

13. Rent seeking

14. The supply of government output

Part IV. Applications

15. Political competition and macroeconomic performance

16. The logic of collective action and macroeconomic performance

17. The size of government

18. The paradox of voting

Part V. Normative Public Choice

19. Real-valued social welfare functions

20. Axiomatic social welfare functions

21. A just social contract

22. Utilitarian contracts

Part V. Normative and Positive Theories of Public Choice Compared

23. Redistribution

24. Allocation, redistribution, and public choice

1.7 Dennis C. Mueller. Public Choice III, (2003)

1. Introduction

Part I. Origins of the State

2. The reason for collective choice – allocative efficiency

3. The reason for collective choice – redistribution

Part II. Public Choice in a direct democracy

4. The choice of voting rule

5. Majority rule – positive properties

6. Majority rule – normative properties

7. Simple alternative to majority rule

8. Complicated alternative to majority rule

9. Exit, voice, and disloyalty

Part III. Public Choice in a representative democracy

10. Federalism

11. Two-party competition – deterministic voting

12. Two-party competition – probabilistic voting

13. Multiparty systems

14. The paradox of voting

15. Rent seeking

16. Bureaucracy

17. Legislatures and bureaucracies

18. Dictatorship

Part IV. Applications and testing

19. Political competition and macroeconomic performance

20. Interest groups, campaign contributions, and lobbying

21. The size of government

22. Government size and economic performance

Part V. Normative Public Choice

23. Social welfare function

24. The impossibility of a social ordering

25. A just social contract

26. The constitution as a utilitarian contract

27. Liberal rights and social choices

Part VI. What have we learned?

28. Has public choice contributed anything to the study of politics?

29. Allocation, redistribution, and public choice

Denis C. Mueller Constitutional Democracy (1996)

I. The Problems

1. Democracy in America

2. Democracy in the Other Part of the World

II. The Constitutional Perspectives.

3. The Constitutional Premise

4. Why have Government

5. The Nature of a Constitution

III. Institutions to Reveal and Advance a Community’s Interests

6. Federalism

7. Direct Democracy

8. Representative Democracy: Proportional Representation

9. Representative Democracy: Two-Party Government

10. The Two Party System of Representation Compared

11. The Parliamentary Voting Rule

IV. Institutions to Constrain Government

12. The Referendum

13. Bicameralism

14. Rights

15. The Market and the State

16. Redistribution

17. The Executive Branch

18. Dictatorship

19. The Judiciary

V. Getting Started

20. Citizenship

21. The Constitutional Convention

VI. Coming to an End

22. Epilogue

 

1.9. Allan Drazen Political Economy in Macroeconomics (2000)

Part I. Basic Issues and tools of analysis

1. What is a Political Economy?

2. Economic Models for Political Analysis

3. Decisionmaking Mechanism

Part II. Commitment, credibility, and reputation

4. The Time Consistency Problem

5. Law Institutions, and Delegated Authority

6. Credibility and Reputation

Part III. Heterogeneity and connflicting interests

7. Elections and changes in Policymakers

8. Redistribution

9. Public Goods

10. Inaction, Delay, and Crisis