Теорема Эрроу о невозможности

Arrow K.J. Social Choice and Individual Values, N.Y.: John Wiley and sons, 1951, rev.ed. 1963.

Hansen P. Another Graphical Proof of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem – Journal of Economic Education, 2002, vol. 33, № 3, p. 217-235.

Lott John R. Donald Wittman's The myth of democratic failure // Public Choice. Vol. 91, Issue 3/4, June 1997. P. 1-13

Riker W.H., Liberalism Against Populism, W.H. Freeman, 1982, Chs. 6, 7, 9, and 10.

Rowley Charles K. Donald Wittman‘s The myth of democratic failure // Public Choice Vol. 91, Issue 3/4, June 1997, P. 15-26.

Saari D. Decisions and Elections. Explaining the Unexpected. Cambridge University Press, 2001, ch. 2-3, p. 21-102.

Sen A., Personal Utilities and Public Judgments: Or What's Wrong with Welfare Economics? // Economic Journal, 1979, 89, P. 537-588; reprinted in A. Sen, Choice, Welfare and Measurement, sections 1-4.

Sen A. Social Choice Theory: A Reexamination // Econometrica, January 1977, 45, P. 53-89; reprinted in A. Sen, Choice, Welfare and Measurement.

Vickrey W. Utility, Strategy and Social Decision Rules.- Journal of Economics, 1960, vol. 74, p. 507-535.

Федерализм и общественный выбор

Остром В., Смысл американского федерализма. Что такое самоуправляющееся общество / Предисл. А. Оболонского. – М.: Арена, 1993. [1991]

Таллок Г., Новый федералист / Общ. ред. Осадчей И. М., Ранневой Н. А., Чернявской Г. В. Вступительное слово Осадчей И. М. – М.: Фонд "За экономическую грамотность", 1993. [1991]

Barnes W. Ledebur L. The New Regional Economics. The U.S. common market and the global economy. L. Sage Publications. 1998

Buchanan James M. Federalism and Individual Sovereignty // Cato Journal, Vol. 15, No 2-3. 1995.

Federalism and Individual Sovereignty: Comment on Buchanan // Cato Journal, Vol. 15, No 2-3. 1995.

Lavrov A., Markushkin A. The Fiscal Structure of the Russian Federation. Financial Flows Between the Center and the Regions. N.Y. East-West Institute M.E. Sharpe. 2001

Peter Ordeshook and Olga Shvetsova, If Hamilton and Madison Were Merely Lucky, What Hope Is there for Russian Federalism? April, 1995, WP #158

Slemrod J. Federal Tax Policy in the real world. Cambridge University Press. 1999.

Манипулирование голосованием

Gibbard A. Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result. – Econometrica, vol. 41, 1973, p/ 586-601.

Satterhwaite M. Strategy-Proofness and Arrows’s Conditions: Existence and Correspondence Theorems for Voting Procedure and Social Welfare Functions. – Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 2 № 2, 1975, p. 187-217.

Политические системы

Алескеров Ф., ОртешукП. Выборы. Голосование. Партии. М.: Academia, 1995, гл.4, с. 142-182.

СморгуновЛ. Современная сравнительная политология. М. РОССПЭН, 2002,разд.2,с.145-273.

Almond G., Powell В. Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach. Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1966.

Haggard St., Kaufman R. The Political Economy of Democratic Transition. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1995.

LijphartA. Democracy in Plural Societies. New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1977, p. 106 (Русский перевод Лейпхарт А. Демократия в многосостав­ных обществах: сравнительное исследование. М.: Аспект Пресс, 1997, с. 110).

Lijphart A. Democracies. New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1984.

 

Раздел 4.ЭКОНОМИКА БЮРОКРАТИИ.

Chicago Studies in Political Economy. Ed. By G. Stiger. Chicago, 1988.

Downs A. Inside Bureaucracy, Boston, Little, Brown, 1967.

Durden G.C., Willsaps S.W. James Buchanan's Contributions to Social and Economic Thought: Citation Counts, Self-Assessment and Peer Review // Constitutional Political Economy, 1996, №7, P. 133-151.

Niskanen W. Bureaucracy and Public Economics 2^nd Ed. Edward Elges, 1994 Vermont

Olson M. Power and Prosperity. Outgrowing Communistic and Capitalist Dictatorship. Basic Books. 2000.

Tullock G. The Politics of Bureaucracy. Washington, D.C., Public Affairs, 1995.

Поиск политической ренты

Кузьминов Я.И. Тезисы о коррупции. М.: ГУ-ВШЭ, 1999.

Левин М.И. Цирик М.Л. Коррупция как объект математического моделирования// Экономика и математические методы, 1998 Т. 34, №3. С. 40-61.

Левин М.И. Цирик М.Л. Математические модели коррупции // Экономика и математические методы, 1998 Т. 34, №4. С. 34-55.

Мизес Л., Бюрократия. Запланированный хаос. Антикапиталистическая ментальность. М.: Дело, 1993.

Олсон М. Рассредоточение власти и общество в переходный период. Лекарства от коррупции, распада и замедления темпов экономического роста // Экономика и математические методы. 1995. Т. 31. Вып. 4. С. 53 – 81.

Ослунд А. Рентоориентированное поведение в российской переходной экономике // Вопросы экономики. 1996. № 8. С. 99 – 108. [1996]

Политическая рента в рыночной и переходной экономке [Реферативный сборник] – М.: ИМЭМО, 1995.

Полтерович В.М. Факторы коррупции // Экономика и математические методы, 1998 Т. 34, №3. С. 30-39.

Allard R. The Measurability of Budgie Related Reen-seeking // Public Choice. 1995. V. 85 №3-4

Anderson G., Boettke P. Soviet venality: A rent-seeking model of the communist state. Public Choice V. 93. P. 37-53. 1997

Bardhan P. Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues // Journal of Economic Literatur e 1997 т. 34. P. 1320–1346.

Bicchierr C. and Rovelli C. Evolution and Revolution. The Dynamics of Corruption // Rationality and Society 1996 v. 7(2).

Gelb A., Hillman A., and Ursprung H. Rents and the Transition – Background paper, World Bank Development Report. 1996.

Krueger A. The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society // American Economic Review. 1974. Vol.64. N. 3. June. P. 291–303.

Parker G. Congress and the Rent-Seeking Society. Ann Arbor. The University of Michigan Press, 1996

Public Choice and Constitutional Economics. Ed. by J. Gwartney, R. Wagner. London, 1988.

The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking. Ed. by Ch. Rowley, R. Tollison, G. Tullock. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988.

Размеры правительства

Паркинсон С.Н. Законы Паркинсона: Сборник. М.: Прогресс, 1989. С.9-58.

Питер Л. Принцип Питера или почему дела идут вкривь и вкось. М.: Прогресс, 1990. С. 24 - 68.

Anand Swamy, Young Lee, Steve Knack and Omar Azfar, Gender and Corruption, November 1999, WP # 232

Blanchard O. and Kremer M. Disorganization. -Preprint. Cambridge: MIT and NBER. 1996

Meltzer A. and Richard S., A Rational Theory of the Size of Government // Journal of Political Economy 89 (October 1981), P. 914-27.

Meltzer A. and Richard S. Tests of a Rational Theory of Government, with comment of Gordon Tullock // Public Choice 41(3) (1983), P. 403-21.

Mueller D.C. The Growth of Government // IMF Staff Papers 34 (March 1987), P. 115-49.

North Douglass and Wallis John J. American Government Expenditures // American Economic Review 72 (May 1982), P. 336-40.

Pommerehne W.W. and Schneider F., Unbalanced Growth Between Public and Private Sectors, in R.H. Haveman, ed., Public Finance and Public Employment, Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1982, P. 309-26.

Stephen Knack, Aid Dependence and Quality of Governance: A Cross-Counrty Empirical Analysis, 2000 World Bank Working Paper № 221.

Robert Cooter, The Optimal Number of Governments for Economic Development. A paper presented to American Law and Economics Association Annual Meeting. New Haven, May 1999.

Парадокс либерализма

Gaertner W., Pattanaik P.K. and Suzumura Kotaro Individual Rights Revisited // Economica, May 1992, 59, P.161-77.

Lott John R. Wittman‘s Donald The myth of democratic failure // Public Choice Vol. 91, Issue 3/4, June 1997. V. 1-13

Schmidtz D. The Limits of Government. An Essay on the Public Goods Argument.- Boulder: Westview Press. 1991

Sen A. Liberty, Unanimity and Rights // Economica, 1976, 43, P. 217-245; reprinted in A. Sen, Choice, Welfare and Measurement.

Sen A. Personal Utilities and Public Judgments; or What's Wrong with Welfare Economics? // Economic Journal, 1979, 89, P. 537-558; reprinted in A. Sen, Choice, Welfare and Measurement, section 7.

Sen A. The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal // Journal of Political Economy, 1970, 78, P. 152-157; reprinted in A. Sen, Choice, Welfare and Measurement.