Denis Muller (Vienna University)

1. Reasons for Collective Choice2. The Choice of Voting Rule

3. Majority Rule

4. Majority Rule and Unanimity Rule

5. Complicated Alternatives to Majority Rule

6. Two-Party Competition

7. Candidate Competition and Campaign Contributions

8. Multiparty Systems

9. Rent Seeking

10. The Size of Government

11. Arrow Impossibility Theorems

12. The Liberal Paradox

13. Constitutional Rights and Constitutional Public Choice

 

Roger Cogleton (GMU)

1. Introduction: Positive Theories of the State: On Overview

2. Property Rights, Coordination Problem and Economic Growth

3. Politics in Modern Democracies

4. Welfare Economics: An Overview of Normative Theories for Policy Analysis

5. Application: Externalities and Pure Public Goods

6. Application: Environmental Externalities

7. Application: Poverty Programs

8. Application: Health Insurance

9. On the Efficiency of Public and Private Production

10. Application: Energy Conservation

11. Application: International Trade and Rent Seeking

12. Taxation, Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Choices

13. Summary and Overview

 

Mark Crain (GMU)

1. Overview: Objective, Grade, Hints

Part I: Government and Economic Perfomance

2. The Rise and Decline of Nations

3. Enforcement Mechanisms and Political Agreements

4. Innovations in the Statees

5. Cultural Determinants of Institutions and Growth

Part II: Legislatures as Firms

6. Approaches to the Organization of Legislatures

7. Reputation and Credibility in Politics: Possible Solutions to the Time-Inconsistency Problem

8. Determinants of Policy: Ideology vs. Economic Interests

Part III: Electoral Institutions and Political Competition

9. Problems in Measuring Competitiveness

10. Campaign Finance, the Image Industry and Determinants of Electoral Outcomes

11. The Politics of Machines: Ballot Technology and Configuration

Robert Tollison (GMU)

Overview of Course

The Demand for Legislation

a. The Theory of Economic Regulation

b. The Theory of Economic Deregulation

c. The Role of Institutions in Promoting Durable Wealth Transfers

d. A Short Course on the Theory of Rent Seeking

The Production and Supply of Wealth Transters

a. Wealth Transfers and the Characteristics of Legislatures

b. Wealth Transfers and the Characteristics of Legislators

c. The Role of the Executive in the Wealth-Transfer Process

Reduced-Form Models of the Demand and Supply of Legislation

a. The Role of Ideology in Voting

b. Public Choice and the Federalists

c. Voters

d. Committees

e. Agency Oversight

f. Heterogeneous Firms

g. Campaign Finance

h. Districting

 

Richard E Wagner (GMU)

1. Welfare economics and the theory of the state

2. Voting rules, preference revelation, and resource allocation

3. Political competition, interest groups and legislation

4. Bureaucracy and public production

5. Federalism and competitive governments

6. Public choice and constitutional order

7. Tax policy and interest group competition

8. Political and Partisan business cycle theory

9. Public debt, fiscal policy, and public choice

10. Economic efficiency and the social production of rules

11. Trade protection and rent seeking

12. Public Choice and International Order

 

Leonid Polishchuk (NES)

1. Предмет политической экономии

2. Политические ограничения: как обуздать "Левиафана"

3. Экономический анализ избирательной системы

4. Разделение властей: экономическая роль сдержек и противовесов

5. Границы государства в экономике

6. Стимулы государственных чиновников

7. Лоббирование и патронаж

8. Политэкономия бездействия

9. Политэкономия реформ

10. Децентрализация государства

11. Основы правового государства