Performatives vs. Constatives (Non-Performatives)

In Austin’s initial work with speech act theory he divided utterances into two types, Performatives and Constatives.

Performatives: Utterances that are used to do things or perform acts.

1. I pronounce you man and wife.

2. I sentence you to 50 years in prison.

3. I promise to drive you to Berlin.

J.Austin initially also believes that performatives can not be verified as true or false.

Constatives: Utterances that can be verified as true or false. These utterances were typically in the form of assertions or statements. “The Neckar River sometimes freezes over”.

Performative Verbs: Many performative utterances also contain performative verbs. The performative verb is one that names the action while performing it. I pronounce, I sentence etc. These verbs are essential for the action to occur. A priest in a catholic wedding could not for example say “You are man and wife”. In place of “I pronounce you man and wife”.

Not every sentence needs a performative verb in order for the action to be carried out. If we leave out the performative verb I promise in the sentence “I promise to drive you to Berlin”, the sentence will still perform the intended action. “I’ll drive you to Berlin”. Performative verbs are usually essential when they are used in the context of ritual behaviors supported by cultural institutions.

Explicit Performative: Sentence that contains a performative verb that makes explicit what kind of act is being performed.

1. The court hereby forbids you to enter your former wife’s house.

Implicit Performatives: Sentence that does not contain a verb that makes explicit what act is being performed.

1. Is there a bank nearby?

Classification of Speech Acts

Based on Austin's (1962), and Searle's (1969) theory, Cohen (1996) identifies five categories of speech acts based on the functions assigned to them.

Representatives	Directives	Expressives	Comissives	Declaratives
assertions	suggestions	apologies	promises	decrees
claims	requests	complaint	threats	declarations
reports	commands	thanks	offers

John Searle gives the following classification of illocutionary speech acts:

· assertives = speech acts that commit a speaker to the truth of the expressed proposition, e.g. reciting a creed

· directives = speech acts that are to cause the hearer to take a particular action, e.g. requests, commands and advice

· commissives = speech acts that commit a speaker to some future action, e.g. promises and oaths

· expressives = speech acts that express the speaker’s attitudes and emotions towards the proposition, e.g. congratulations, excuses and thanks

· declarations = speech acts that change the reality in accord with the proposition of the declaration, e.g. baptisms, pronouncing someone guilty or pronouncing someone husband and wife

Indirect Speech Acts

In most languages, we have three basic sentence types: declarative, interrogative and imperative. If there is no direct relationship between a sentence type and an illocutionary force, the speech act is indirect. If there is a direct match, it is a direct speech act.

Examples:

1. “Pass the salt!” - Imperative is used to make a request > direct speech act.

2. “Can you pass the salt?” - Interrogative is used to make a request > indirect speech act.

Some more examples: For instance, my remark that you are standing on my foot is normally taken as a demand that you move; my question whether you can pass the salt is normally taken as a request that you do so. These are examples of so-called indirect speech acts (Searle 1975).

Indirect speech acts are less common than might first appear. In asking whether you are intending to quit smoking, I might be taken as well to be suggesting that you quit. However, while the embattled smoker might indeed jump to this interpretation, we do well to consider what evidence would mandate it. After all, while I probably would not have asked whether you intended to quit smoking unless I hoped you would quit, I can evince such a hope without suggesting anything. Similarly, the advertiser who tells us that Miracle Cream reversed hair loss in Bob, Mike, and Fred, also most likely hopes that I will believe it will reverse my own hair loss. That does not show that he is (indirectly) asserting that it will. Whether he is asserting this depends on whether he can be accused of being a liar if in fact he does not believe that Miracle Cream will staunch my hair loss.

Analysis of an indirect speech act

Searle’s approach:

- assume the existence of a dual illocutionary force: the non-literal/indirect force is primary; the literal/direct force is secondary

- Whether an utterance operates as an indirect speech act or not has to do with the relevant felicity conditions.

- Some kind of inference is necessary when an addressee understands an indirect speech act that a speaker performs.

- Apart from inference, there is a certain degree of conventionality about speech acts.