The essence of the nuclear issue of the DPRK in the military-strategic plan

ABSTRACT

   The volume of the thesis: 40 p.
       

The Number of sources used: 25
  

Key words: The problem of denuclearization of Korean Peninsula, USA, South Korea, Russia, IAEA, DPRK, RK, NPT

The subject of the study of research work is the problem of denuclearization of Korean Peninsula                                   

The purpose of the work: based on scientific analysis to identify opportunities and the prospects of denuclearization of North Korea
     

   The source base there were works of domestic and foreign scientists on the study of the East-Asian region. A huge flow of scientific literature in a number of Russian, and English sources.                             

Theoretical and methodological basis of the thesis. The paper uses empirical and analytical methods to describe the key parameters of the problem under study, as well as a systematic approach. Elements of content analysis of political events reflected in various sources of information are used: monographs, mass media, scientific and educational Internet resources.
  

Scientific novelty of the research. External factors have had a significant impact on North Korea. The identification of North Korea's development prospects is a scientific novelty that will give impetus to the development of renewed relations between North Korea and world powers in various fields.

   The practical significance of the research it consists in studying the theoretical and methodological foundations of denuclearization problems, identifying new centers of political and economic development, and identifying the factors that caused the so-called problems in denuclearization.

CONTENTS

Introduction
Chapter 1. History of diplomatic negotiations on the North Korean nuclear program
1.1 The essence of the nuclear issue of the DPRK in the military-strategic plan
1.2  Negotiations in the 90s-00s
1.3 D.Trump and Kim Jong Un’s negotiations in the period up to 2017-2019
Chapter 2. The nature of the North Korean regime
2.1 Political features of the North Korean regime
2.2 Features of Kim Jong UN's dictatorship     Chapter 3. DPRK within the context of regional security   3.1 Russia’s and China’s position on denuclearization of N.Korea   3.2 Regional security in East Asia
Conclusion
References

 

                                            CHAPTER 1

Negotiations in the 90s-00s

    The structural changes in the system of international relations that took place in 1991-1992 had a significant impact on the development of the situation around the issue of North Korea's nuclear program and the prospects for a nuclear-free status of the Peninsula. The possibility of normalizing relations between the DPRK and Japan and, as a result, receiving significant economic assistance and reparations, directly depended on Pyongyang signing the safeguards agreement and allowing IAEA inspectors into the country.

    The position of the USSR and China on the issue of nuclear control largely coincided with the position of the United States, and the establishment of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Seoul in 1991, the opening of joint foreign trade offices in Seoul and Beijing, which, in fact, meant the establishment of diplomatic relations and could contribute to a General defusing of tension in the region. The first Gulf war led the United States to stop considering nuclear weapons as the main deterrent, which in turn contributed to a change in the United States ' position regarding its nuclear weapons in South Korea. In may 1991, US representatives made it clear for the first time that Washington was going to withdraw its nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula. Moreover, in June 1991, the representative of the state Department, R. Boucher, made a special statement that the United States would not use nuclear weapons against North Korea or any other state party to the NPT.

    These structural changes, as well as the new us position, have had a significant impact on North Korea's policy on this issue. If in the middle of 1991 North Korea insisted that the safeguards agreement could only be signed after the complete withdrawal of American nuclear weapons from the South of the Peninsula.in November 1991, representatives of the DPRK were ready to sign the agreement at the beginning of the withdrawal process. The withdrawal began three days after this statement, and on December 11, 1991. South Korean Prime Minister Chun Wonsik said that all American weapons have been withdrawn from South Korea and offered to open American bases for inspections in exchange for inspections of North Korean nuclear facilities. Moreover, South Korea has made it clear that in case of concessions by Pyongyang on the nuclear issue will be reviewed by the South Korean position on the joint us-South Korean military exercise Team Spirit.

    The change in the total structure of relations in the region and, as a consequence, the possibility of mutual concessions resulted in the negotiation of the space between the sides, with the result that at the end of 1991 was signed, and in early 1992 came into effect two important documents: the Agreement on reconciliation, nonaggression, exchange and cooperation between the ROK and the DPRK; Joint Declaration on a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. In the Declaration on nuclear-weapon-free status, the parties pledged not to test, produce, acquire, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons. It was also stated that nuclear energy will only be used for peaceful purposes. A separate paragraph concerned the refusal to own nuclear fuel reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities. To guarantee the agreement, the parties agreed to conduct mutual inspections. The signing of these agreements contributed to the further development of cooperation between the United States, Kazakhstan and North Korea on the nuclear issue. In January 1992, negotiations between representatives of the United States and the DPRK were held at an unprecedented high level in new York.as a result, on January 30, 1992, the Deputy Minister of atomic energy of North Korea, Hong Kunbo, signed a safeguards agreement with the Director General of the IAEA, H. Blix. Already in April 1992, the agreement was ratified by the Supreme people's Assembly of the DPRK, and since June, the IAEA has begun inspections of North Korean nuclear facilities. Although many American analysts believed that the IAEA inspections would hardly be able to stop the development of the North Korean nuclear program, since it is unlikely that the Agency will get access to all nuclear facilities on the territory of the DPRK. In 1992, IAEA representatives conducted six inspections of North Korean nuclear facilities, and in late 1992, the Agency also conducted laboratory tests of plutonium and spent nuclear fuel. Analysis of the plutonium sample showed that it had been accumulating for several years and was obtained from reactor fuel, which gave reason to suspect North Korea of hiding some plutonium. Based on this, the IAEA requested a special inspection of two spent fuel storage facilities, which were not declared, but were refused on the grounds that these facilities are not related to the nuclear program and are of a military nature. The Agency said that in this case, the issue could be referred to the UN Security Council, but North Korea continued to evade inspections, explaining its position by resuming the us-South Korean Team Spirit program and introducing a paramilitary situation in the DPRK in this regard. On March 12, 1993, based on the tenth article of the NPT, according to which "each party to this Treaty, in the exercise of its state sovereignty, has the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that exceptional circumstances related to the content of this Treaty have jeopardized the Supreme interests of its country", the DPRK declared its withdrawal from the Treaty. This date is considered the official beginning of the first nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. The DPRK's decision to withdraw from the NPT provoked a sharply negative reaction from the United States, China, Russia, Japan and the entire world community.

    In April 1993, the IAEA Board of governors declared that North Korea had violated the NPT and expressed its intention to request the UN Security Council to apply sanctions against Pyongyang. The United States discussed two possible solutions to this problem: sanctions or missile strikes on North Korean nuclear facilities. Perry, the defense Secretary, noted that preemptive missile strikes would lead to the beginning of the second Korean war, and recommended that the President use the policy of imposing sanctions. In March-April 1993, the North Korean foreign Ministry offered to hold talks between the two countries based on the principles of equality and mutual benefit to resolve the nuclear issue. These statements indicate that the first nuclear crisis was caused primarily by the increasing isolation of the DPRK, both in the region and in the world as a whole. Pyongyang's initiatives, as well as the inability to take a decision on economic sanctions through the UN Security Council due to the opposition of China and, to some extent, Russia, contributed to the fact that the US moved to direct negotiations with North Korea

    The first round of negotiations took place in new York from 2 to 11 June 1993 and ended with the signing of a joint Declaration, the main point of which was the DPRK's commitment to suspend its withdrawal from the NPT. the US, in turn, guaranteed North Korea that it would not use nuclear weapons against it. The parties pledged to respect each other's sovereignty and observe the principle of non-interference in internal Affairs. In the third paragraph of the Declaration, the parties expressed support for the process of peaceful unification of the Peninsula. The second round of talks between the American and North Korean delegations took place in Geneva from July 14 to 19. The main result of this round was the agreement in principle of the United States to support the construction of light-water reactors in North Korea. The DPRK has pledged to resume consultations with the IAEA, as well as to re-enter into negotiations with South Korea on a wide range of issues.

    However, the main problem was that the US and North Korea had different views on the item on IAEA inspections. The United States believes that all sites should be inspected, including two undeclared ones, while North Korea has agreed to allow observers only to the declared sites. Only by the end of 1993 was an agreement reached, under which the DPRK allowed inspections at seven nuclear facilities and resumed dialogue with the ROK in exchange for the US suspending the Team Spirit program and setting a date for the third round of negotiations. The third round of talks was scheduled for July 1994, but it was interrupted by the death of Kim Il Sung. However, after four months of meetings, a framework agreement was concluded between the United States and the DPRK on 21 October 1994 in Geneva. In accordance with this agreement, North Korea has pledged to stop building a nuclear reactor, abandon work on obtaining plutonium, dismantle the most suspicious facilities, allow IAEA inspectors into the country, and so on. In fact, this meant curtailing the DPRK's nuclear program. A special international consortium, the Korean Peninsula energy development organization (KEDO), was created to solve the North's energy problem. Korea. As part of the KEDO, two light-water reactors were to be built in the DPRK by 2003. It is believed that it is almost impossible to obtain weapons-grade plutonium from such reactors.

    Until the late 1990s, the situation around the Korean Peninsula and the North Korean nuclear program remained relatively stable. This was due to both the "solar heat" policy pursued by the South and the" soft landing " policy (soft landing, support for North Korea's reform from within) pursued by the United States. It should also be noted that economic difficulties, natural disasters (floods), famine, as well as three years of mourning for the death of Kim Il Sung, to some extent caused the moderate nature of North Korean policy. A new crisis over the North Korean nuclear program broke out in 2002, although its origins can be attributed to 2001.

 

Отношения КНДР и Китая

 

    For North Korea, the lifeline provided by China is paramount to its existence. Without China, the North Korean economy would cease to function; China provides for approximately 70 percent of North Korea’s total trade.10 North Korea’s mineral exports to China have been a major source of hard currency for its impoverished economy. As the largest importer of North Korean mineral products, China has participated in 20 North Korean 7. mining projects and remains Pyongyang’s leading mining project investor.11 North Korea’s anthracite coal is its major export item; China is the sole recipient.12 North Korea’s anthracite exports to China increased 15.5 percent in 2013 compared to the previous year, with shipments totaling US$1.37 billion.13 Although North Koreans bristle at Chinese treatment of them like a poor province, dictating the terms of all interactions, they have little choice given their isolated and dependent state. Pyongyang’s continued nuclear and missile tests in the face of Chinese opposition have been an embarrassment to the Chinese leadership, with frustration growing in Beijing. In response to a North Korean nuclear test in February 2013, China summoned North Korea’s ambassador to communicate Beijing’s strong dissatisfaction. The execution of Jang Sungthaek in December 2013 further shocked Chinese government offi cials as Jang was China’s main interlocutor and was regarded as a promoter of economic reform in North Korea. Thus far, Beijing has not doubled down on its North Korean stakes by embracing the young leader Kim Jong- un who has yet to pay a visit to China. But it is not clear how long China can tolerate losing its main contact inside the regime, with no evidence of a replacement. North Korea and China’s historical ties, combined with both countries’ strategic and security interests, create a partnership that cannot be easily broken. Despite the noticeable and growing strains in the bilateral relationship, China continues to support and maintain its relations with North Korea because of its strategic signifi cance. However, cracks have slowly begun to emerge. These cracks in the relationship provide an opportunity for South Korea to further engage with China and shape Beijing’s policies toward Pyongyang.

ABSTRACT

   The volume of the thesis: 40 p.
       

The Number of sources used: 25
  

Key words: The problem of denuclearization of Korean Peninsula, USA, South Korea, Russia, IAEA, DPRK, RK, NPT

The subject of the study of research work is the problem of denuclearization of Korean Peninsula                                   

The purpose of the work: based on scientific analysis to identify opportunities and the prospects of denuclearization of North Korea
     

   The source base there were works of domestic and foreign scientists on the study of the East-Asian region. A huge flow of scientific literature in a number of Russian, and English sources.                             

Theoretical and methodological basis of the thesis. The paper uses empirical and analytical methods to describe the key parameters of the problem under study, as well as a systematic approach. Elements of content analysis of political events reflected in various sources of information are used: monographs, mass media, scientific and educational Internet resources.
  

Scientific novelty of the research. External factors have had a significant impact on North Korea. The identification of North Korea's development prospects is a scientific novelty that will give impetus to the development of renewed relations between North Korea and world powers in various fields.

   The practical significance of the research it consists in studying the theoretical and methodological foundations of denuclearization problems, identifying new centers of political and economic development, and identifying the factors that caused the so-called problems in denuclearization.

CONTENTS

Introduction
Chapter 1. History of diplomatic negotiations on the North Korean nuclear program
1.1 The essence of the nuclear issue of the DPRK in the military-strategic plan
1.2  Negotiations in the 90s-00s
1.3 D.Trump and Kim Jong Un’s negotiations in the period up to 2017-2019
Chapter 2. The nature of the North Korean regime
2.1 Political features of the North Korean regime
2.2 Features of Kim Jong UN's dictatorship     Chapter 3. DPRK within the context of regional security   3.1 Russia’s and China’s position on denuclearization of N.Korea   3.2 Regional security in East Asia
Conclusion
References

 

                                            CHAPTER 1

The essence of the nuclear issue of the DPRK in the military-strategic plan

    It is generally recognized that the greatest threat to global peace and security is posed by weapons of mass destruction, primarily nuclear weapons. Although the likelihood of a large-scale military conflict involving nuclear weapons has decreased dramatically since the end of the Cold War, the danger comes from the very existence of such weapons. In this regard, special attention is drawn to the so-called threshold States that have prerequisites for creating their own nuclear weapons. If this happens, the balance of power will be disrupted at the regional, and possibly global, level.

    However, the DPRK's nuclear program is also a danger to the international community. This is due to the violation of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, as well as the possibility of exporting nuclear technologies to other countries. There are different opinions about when North Korea began developing its nuclear program. Some experts believe that this happened almost immediately after the end of the Korean war, during which the US authorities seriously considered the possibility of using nuclear weapons against the DPRK. Others attribute the beginning of the DPRK's nuclear program to the first half of the 1960s. The fact that North Korea has the potential to develop its own nuclear program became obvious in 1947, when deposits of uranium were discovered in the North of the country. However, the path from uranium to nuclear weapons is long and difficult, and it is impossible to do without high technologies. The Democratic people's Republic of Korea, which was created only in 1948 and was devastated by the bloody civil war of 1951-1953, could not make this journey on its own. In 1956, the DPRK and the Soviet Union signed an agreement on cooperation in the nuclear field, but there was no talk of nuclear weapons. It was simply dangerous to let the unpredictable "great leader" Kim Il Sung join the elite "nuclear club" — the Korean war that ended shortly before, unleashed by the North, almost resulted in world war III. The agreement provided for the development of North Korean nuclear power.

       Until the mid-1980s, events developed in this way. In 1965, an experimental reactor was launched in the town of Yanbian with the technical assistance of the USSR. The research center for nuclear physics was also established there. In order to maintain secrecy, the entire complex was named "Yanbian furniture factory". Highly enriched uranium was used as fuel in the reactor. Fuel cells for the North Korean reactor were supplied from the Soviet Union, but over time, North Korea has established production of uranium from its own deposits. North Korea pledged to export spent fuel from the reactor back to the Soviet Union, which allowed Moscow to control the development of this project. Under pressure from Moscow in 1977, it was put under the supervision of the International atomic energy Agency.

    A sharp acceleration of the North Korean nuclear program occurred in the 1980s, and this was due to a number of reasons. First, the gradual rapprochement between Moscow, Beijing, and Seoul, which began in the mid-1980s, and the General development trends of the socialist camp countries led to the growing isolation of North Korea. The gradual destruction of the bipolar structure of international relations, the tendency to bring former ideological rivals closer together, and, as a result, the narrowing of the field for diplomatic maneuvers, became one of the factors that accelerated the development of the North Korean nuclear missile program. The economic difficulties that the DPRK is experiencing on an increasing scale have also played a role: with the growing gap between the economies of the North and the South, the build-up of conventional weapons has become increasingly problematic.

           To speed up the nuclear program, the DPRK authorities have stepped up cooperation with the USSR. In may of 1984, Kim Il sung made a trip to Moscow. At a meeting with the Soviet leader K. Chernenko, he asked for assistance in building a nuclear power plant in North Korea to solve the problem of electricity shortage in the DPRK. The Soviet side agreed to implement the project, but the condition for its implementation was the accession of the DPRK to the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In December 1985 North Korea joined into Non-Proliferation Treaty, at the same time then North Korea signed an agreement with the Soviet Union on scientific and technical cooperation. According to this agreement, the Soviet Union undertook to build a nuclear power plant in North Korea. In December 1988, the deadline for North Korea to sign a safeguards agreement with the IAEA expired. Pyongyang signed the Treaty in December 1985, but an error was made while filling out the necessary documents. Whether it was accidental or deliberate is unknown. But as a result of this bureaucratic error, the final deadline for signing verification agreements with the IAEA was delayed until December 1988.

    However, even after this period, the DPRK did not sign the agreement. Such actions by Pyongyang have raised suspicions in the US and in the West. Based on intelligence, it was concluded that the size of the gas-graphite reactor is too large for scientific research, but not enough for energy needs. In 1989 he appeared that built in Yanbian plant for reprocessing of nuclear fuel, as well as the site for testing. According to South Korean analytical data, since the mid-1990s, Pyongyang has been able to start producing nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, at the official level, Pyongyang advocated turning the Korean Peninsula into a nuclear-weapon-free zone. June 23, 1986 North Korea issued a special statement that was approved by its two main allies, the Soviet Union and China. In this statement, the government of the DPRK committed itself to refrain from testing, producing, storing and arming nuclear weapons, promised not to allow the establishment of any foreign military bases, including nuclear bases, and not to allow the transport of foreign nuclear weapons through its territory, airspace and territorial waters. A year later, on July 13, 1987, the DPRK authorities confirmed their position on the nuclear-free status of the Korean Peninsula. It seems that these actions were primarily aimed at the gradual removal of American nuclear weapons from the territory of the Korean Peninsula. The initiatives put forward by Pyongyang, the US government proposed, first, to take practical steps to stop the deployment of new nuclear weapons and their delivery means in South Korea, to withdraw all existing nuclear weapons in the ROK and cancel all operational plans relating to the use of nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. In November 1989 The DPRK foreign Ministry issued a new statement in which he offered to hold talks involving the DPRK, the United States and South Korea on the withdrawal of us nuclear weapons from the southern part of the Peninsula, and also to carry out negotiations between North and South for the adoption of a Declaration on the transformation of the Peninsula into a nuclear-free peace zone. However, negotiations on signing a safeguards agreement with the IAEA continued. According to the Declaration of the United States from 1978, "the United States will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States that signed the NPT except in cases of an attack on U.S. territory or armed forces, or its allies by such a state which is allied with nuclear powers, or acting in conjunction with nuclear power in the implementation or support of such attacks". Due to the fact that the ROK was an ally of the United States, and the DPRK was an ally of the USSR and China nuclear powers this Declaration did not serve as an obstacle to the use of nuclear weapons by the United States against North Korea. That is why, in order to ensure its own security, the DPRK demanded the following amendments: first, the nuclear-weapon States should not "threaten a non-nuclear state, a member of the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons"; second, it was necessary to completely remove nuclear weapons from the territory of the Korean Peninsula. In a statement addressed to the IAEA, the DPRK warned that it could resort to the tenth article of the NPT and withdraw from the Treaty if its demands for amendments were not met. However, due to changes in the General system of international relations, in the context of Moscow and Seoul's rapprochement and the simultaneous weakening of Moscow's ties with Pyongyang, the DPRK's positions in the negotiations were not strong enough, and the proposals were not implemented.

 

Negotiations in the 90s-00s

    The structural changes in the system of international relations that took place in 1991-1992 had a significant impact on the development of the situation around the issue of North Korea's nuclear program and the prospects for a nuclear-free status of the Peninsula. The possibility of normalizing relations between the DPRK and Japan and, as a result, receiving significant economic assistance and reparations, directly depended on Pyongyang signing the safeguards agreement and allowing IAEA inspectors into the country.

    The position of the USSR and China on the issue of nuclear control largely coincided with the position of the United States, and the establishment of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Seoul in 1991, the opening of joint foreign trade offices in Seoul and Beijing, which, in fact, meant the establishment of diplomatic relations and could contribute to a General defusing of tension in the region. The first Gulf war led the United States to stop considering nuclear weapons as the main deterrent, which in turn contributed to a change in the United States ' position regarding its nuclear weapons in South Korea. In may 1991, US representatives made it clear for the first time that Washington was going to withdraw its nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula. Moreover, in June 1991, the representative of the state Department, R. Boucher, made a special statement that the United States would not use nuclear weapons against North Korea or any other state party to the NPT.

    These structural changes, as well as the new us position, have had a significant impact on North Korea's policy on this issue. If in the middle of 1991 North Korea insisted that the safeguards agreement could only be signed after the complete withdrawal of American nuclear weapons from the South of the Peninsula.in November 1991, representatives of the DPRK were ready to sign the agreement at the beginning of the withdrawal process. The withdrawal began three days after this statement, and on December 11, 1991. South Korean Prime Minister Chun Wonsik said that all American weapons have been withdrawn from South Korea and offered to open American bases for inspections in exchange for inspections of North Korean nuclear facilities. Moreover, South Korea has made it clear that in case of concessions by Pyongyang on the nuclear issue will be reviewed by the South Korean position on the joint us-South Korean military exercise Team Spirit.

    The change in the total structure of relations in the region and, as a consequence, the possibility of mutual concessions resulted in the negotiation of the space between the sides, with the result that at the end of 1991 was signed, and in early 1992 came into effect two important documents: the Agreement on reconciliation, nonaggression, exchange and cooperation between the ROK and the DPRK; Joint Declaration on a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. In the Declaration on nuclear-weapon-free status, the parties pledged not to test, produce, acquire, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons. It was also stated that nuclear energy will only be used for peaceful purposes. A separate paragraph concerned the refusal to own nuclear fuel reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities. To guarantee the agreement, the parties agreed to conduct mutual inspections. The signing of these agreements contributed to the further development of cooperation between the United States, Kazakhstan and North Korea on the nuclear issue. In January 1992, negotiations between representatives of the United States and the DPRK were held at an unprecedented high level in new York.as a result, on January 30, 1992, the Deputy Minister of atomic energy of North Korea, Hong Kunbo, signed a safeguards agreement with the Director General of the IAEA, H. Blix. Already in April 1992, the agreement was ratified by the Supreme people's Assembly of the DPRK, and since June, the IAEA has begun inspections of North Korean nuclear facilities. Although many American analysts believed that the IAEA inspections would hardly be able to stop the development of the North Korean nuclear program, since it is unlikely that the Agency will get access to all nuclear facilities on the territory of the DPRK. In 1992, IAEA representatives conducted six inspections of North Korean nuclear facilities, and in late 1992, the Agency also conducted laboratory tests of plutonium and spent nuclear fuel. Analysis of the plutonium sample showed that it had been accumulating for several years and was obtained from reactor fuel, which gave reason to suspect North Korea of hiding some plutonium. Based on this, the IAEA requested a special inspection of two spent fuel storage facilities, which were not declared, but were refused on the grounds that these facilities are not related to the nuclear program and are of a military nature. The Agency said that in this case, the issue could be referred to the UN Security Council, but North Korea continued to evade inspections, explaining its position by resuming the us-South Korean Team Spirit program and introducing a paramilitary situation in the DPRK in this regard. On March 12, 1993, based on the tenth article of the NPT, according to which "each party to this Treaty, in the exercise of its state sovereignty, has the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that exceptional circumstances related to the content of this Treaty have jeopardized the Supreme interests of its country", the DPRK declared its withdrawal from the Treaty. This date is considered the official beginning of the first nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. The DPRK's decision to withdraw from the NPT provoked a sharply negative reaction from the United States, China, Russia, Japan and the entire world community.

    In April 1993, the IAEA Board of governors declared that North Korea had violated the NPT and expressed its intention to request the UN Security Council to apply sanctions against Pyongyang. The United States discussed two possible solutions to this problem: sanctions or missile strikes on North Korean nuclear facilities. Perry, the defense Secretary, noted that preemptive missile strikes would lead to the beginning of the second Korean war, and recommended that the President use the policy of imposing sanctions. In March-April 1993, the North Korean foreign Ministry offered to hold talks between the two countries based on the principles of equality and mutual benefit to resolve the nuclear issue. These statements indicate that the first nuclear crisis was caused primarily by the increasing isolation of the DPRK, both in the region and in the world as a whole. Pyongyang's initiatives, as well as the inability to take a decision on economic sanctions through the UN Security Council due to the opposition of China and, to some extent, Russia, contributed to the fact that the US moved to direct negotiations with North Korea

    The first round of negotiations took place in new York from 2 to 11 June 1993 and ended with the signing of a joint Declaration, the main point of which was the DPRK's commitment to suspend its withdrawal from the NPT. the US, in turn, guaranteed North Korea that it would not use nuclear weapons against it. The parties pledged to respect each other's sovereignty and observe the principle of non-interference in internal Affairs. In the third paragraph of the Declaration, the parties expressed support for the process of peaceful unification of the Peninsula. The second round of talks between the American and North Korean delegations took place in Geneva from July 14 to 19. The main result of this round was the agreement in principle of the United States to support the construction of light-water reactors in North Korea. The DPRK has pledged to resume consultations with the IAEA, as well as to re-enter into negotiations with South Korea on a wide range of issues.

    However, the main problem was that the US and North Korea had different views on the item on IAEA inspections. The United States believes that all sites should be inspected, including two undeclared ones, while North Korea has agreed to allow observers only to the declared sites. Only by the end of 1993 was an agreement reached, under which the DPRK allowed inspections at seven nuclear facilities and resumed dialogue with the ROK in exchange for the US suspending the Team Spirit program and setting a date for the third round of negotiations. The third round of talks was scheduled for July 1994, but it was interrupted by the death of Kim Il Sung. However, after four months of meetings, a framework agreement was concluded between the United States and the DPRK on 21 October 1994 in Geneva. In accordance with this agreement, North Korea has pledged to stop building a nuclear reactor, abandon work on obtaining plutonium, dismantle the most suspicious facilities, allow IAEA inspectors into the country, and so on. In fact, this meant curtailing the DPRK's nuclear program. A special international consortium, the Korean Peninsula energy development organization (KEDO), was created to solve the North's energy problem. Korea. As part of the KEDO, two light-water reactors were to be built in the DPRK by 2003. It is believed that it is almost impossible to obtain weapons-grade plutonium from such reactors.

    Until the late 1990s, the situation around the Korean Peninsula and the North Korean nuclear program remained relatively stable. This was due to both the "solar heat" policy pursued by the South and the" soft landing " policy (soft landing, support for North Korea's reform from within) pursued by the United States. It should also be noted that economic difficulties, natural disasters (floods), famine, as well as three years of mourning for the death of Kim Il Sung, to some extent caused the moderate nature of North Korean policy. A new crisis over the North Korean nuclear program broke out in 2002, although its origins can be attributed to 2001.