Население в международном праве.

Население в международном праве.

Definition of population

1. 1a: the whole number of people or inhabitants in a country or region b: the total of individuals occupying an area or making up a whole c: the total of particles at a particular energy level —used especially of atoms in a laser

2. 2: the act or process of populating

3. 3a: a body of persons or individuals having a quality or characteristic in common b (1): the organisms inhabiting a particular locality (2): a group of interbreeding organisms that represents the level of organization at which speciation begins

4. 4: a group of individual persons, objects, or items from which samples are taken for statistical measurement

Population

A population is all the organisms of the same group or species, which live in a particular geographical area, and have the capability of interbreeding.

The area that is used to define a sexual population is defined as the area where inter-breeding is potentially possible between any pair within the area, and where the probability of interbreeding is greater than the probability of cross-breeding with individuals from other areas.

In sociology, population refers to a collection of humans. Demography is a social science which entails the statistical study of human populations. This article refers mainly to the human population.

World human population

As of today's date, the world's population is estimated by the United States Census Bureau to be 7.525 billion. The US Census Bureau estimates the 7 billion number was surpassed on 12 March 2012. According to a separate estimate by the United Nations, Earth’s population exceeded seven billion in October 2011, a milestone that offers unprecedented challenges and opportunities to all of humanity, according to UNFPA, the United Nations Population Fund.

According to papers published by the United States Census Bureau, the world population hit 6.5 billion on 24 February 2006. The United Nations Population Fund designated 12 October 1999 as the approximate day on which world population reached 6 billion. This was about 12 years after world population reached 5 billion in 1987, and 6 years after world population reached 5.5 billion in 1993. The population of countries such as Nigeria, is not even known to the nearest million, so there is a considerable margin of error in such estimates.

Researcher Carl Haub calculated that a total of over 100 billion people have probably been born in the last 2000 years.

Control

Human population control is the practice of altering the rate of growth of a human population. Historically, human population control has been implemented with the goal of increasing the rate of population growth. In the period from the 1950s to the 1980s, concerns about global population growth and its effects on poverty, environmental degradation, and political stability led to efforts to reduce population growth rates. While population control can involve measures that improve people's lives by giving them greater control of their reproduction, a few programs, most notably the Chinese government's one-child per family policy, have resorted to coercive measures.

In the 1970s, tension grew between population control advocates and women's health activists who advanced women's reproductive rights as part of a human rights-based approach. Growing opposition to the narrow population control focus led to a significant change in population control policies in the early 1980s.

 

The concept of nationality in public international law

Nationality as a human right

Refugees

Art. 34 of the 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees stipulates that the contracting states shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalisation of refugees. They shall in particular make every effort to expedite naturalisation proceedings and to reduce as far as possible the charges and costs of such proceedings. Art. 34 does not provide for an individual right of naturalisation for refugees. The duty to facilitate implies an obligation for naturalisation authorities and courts to take into account the special situation of refugees in exercising their discretionary authority. According to the jurisprudence of the

German Federal Administrative Court, not only does art. 34 have interstate effect. Art. 34 implies a directly applicable obligation which entitles refugees to rely upon the provision before administrative authorities and courts applying nationality law.10 The obligation to take into account the particular situation of refugees is derived from the human rights character of acquisition of nationality. The German administrative courts have therefore taken the view that in cases of discretionary naturalisations, an application can only be refused if predominant public interests are against the naturalisation of a refugee. The limitation of the discretionary authority is based on the fact that refugees are typically lacking the protection which a national usually receives from his home state. Therefore, the Federal Republic of Germany under public international law has a duty to protect refugees, including the appropriate regulation of their nationality. If, on balance, public interests are both in favour of as well as against the naturalisation of a refugee, the administrative authorities have to decide, within the framework of their discretionary authority, whether the naturalisation of a refugee is in the public interest. A refugee has an individual right to a discretionary decision, taking into account a proper evaluation of his particular situation.

The Bremen Administrative Appeal Court has, therefore, held that German authorities are in violation of art. 34 of the Geneva Convention when refusing the naturalisation of a refugee exclusively on the grounds that he or she holds a humanitarian temporary residence permit.

To what extent art. 34 reflects a customary rule of public international law is doubtful. In the European sphere, however, there can be no question that a duty to facilitate the naturalisation of refugees is part of a common European standard. Art. 6, para. 4, g ECN contains a duty to facilitate the acquisition of nationality for stateless persons and recognised refugees lawfully and habitually resident on its territory.

The term 'recognised refugees' includes, but is not limited to, refugees recognised under the 1951 Geneva Convention. State parties are free to include other types of refugees in this group. The requirement of a habitual residence should not be interpreted as an exclusion of those refugees who receive only a temporary residence permit. Unless there is a concrete assumption that refugees may find protection elsewhere, the reception of refugees recognised under the Geneva Convention can be generally considered as a habitual residence.

The duty to facilitate naturalisation means that the authorities and administrative courts have to take into account the particular situation of refugees when applying domestic law. This may also imply a duty to take account of the special difficulties of refugees in procuring documents in cooperation with the authorities of the country of origin of a refugee, which would be generally required in order to naturalise an applicant. In addition, difficulties may arise with respect to the language knowledge required to naturalise a person. A similar principle applies with respect to the duty to renounce a previous nationality.

While, generally also in case of refugees, such an obligation may be required, it must be taken into account that renunciation of a nationality may require particular cooperation with the country of origin which may pose difficulties for refugees resulting from the danger of persecution.

Other categories of persons

Other categories of persons also exist, who generally enjoy privileged treatment with respect to acquisition of nationality under international treaties and under domestic law of most European states. Art. 6, para. 4 of the European Convention on Nationality mentions as categories whose naturalisation is to be facilitated:

- spouses of its nationals,

- children of one of its nationals if, under an exception envisaged under internal law, such children born abroad do not possess at the

time of birth the nationality of the state party,

- children, one of whose parents acquires or has acquired its nationality,

- children adopted by one of its nationals,

Nationality in public international law and european law 41

- persons who were born on its territory and who reside there lawfully and habitually,

- persons who are lawfully and habitually resident on its territory for a period of time beginning before the age of eighteen, that period

to be determined by the internal law of the state party concerned,

- stateless persons and recognised refugees lawfully and habitually resident on its territory.

A more detailed discussion of some of these categories will follow in the subsequent sections. In the general human rights context discussed in this section, one may note that the European Convention on Nationality - while recognising the right of each state to determine under its own law who are its nationals - does at the same time recognise a substantial duty to take into account the particular situation of human beings as being dependent on nationality as a fundamental legal status. Although the term 'facilitate' is not defined in the Convention, the jurisprudence of national courts indicates that facilitation implies a duty and not a mere procedural possibility to apply for naturalisation. Facilitation means not only a differentiation between different categories of persons but also, in the words of the Explanatory Report, ensuring favourable conditions for the acquisition of nationality for the persons belonging to each of the categories of persons listed in the sub-paragraphs. Examples include a reduction in the required length of residence, less stringent language requirements, an easier procedure, lower procedural fees.12 Facilitation in this sense means making the acquisition of nationality significantly easier than for foreigners generally (Hall 1999: 586).

Human rights implications of nationality law are traditionally most notably recognised in the treaty provisions on loss and deprivation of nationality. Although loss and deprivation are also generally considered a matter for the discretion of states, there has been early recognition of the limitations of such discretion. Art. 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights already provides for a prohibition of arbitrary deprivation or refusal of the right to change one's nationality. Further details will be discussed in the section on loss and deprivation (see section 1.3).

Abuse of nationality

Facilitating access to nationality for migrants has resulted in growing concern among states that more open access to nationality may be misused to evade immigration restrictions or escape expulsion or deportation. The misuse of nationality laws, therefore, has also become an issue of international co-operation. Thus, for instance, nationality has been renounced in order to escape deportation by acquiring the status of statelessness. States permitting this renunciation are generally acting in violation of public international law. A state's duty to respect the sovereignty of other states and their sovereign right to decide on the admission of foreigners implies a duty to accept a responsibility for a state's own citizens including an obligation to allow their return. This obligation could be easily overcome by a renunciation of nationality in order to prevent the return of a state's own citizens. In addition, state practice supports the rule of the avoidance of statelessness. Establishing statelessness for the main purpose of restricting a state's sovereign right to decide on the admission and residence of foreign nationals means acting against the community of nations. Such renunciation may therefore be considered as invalid for the purposes of executing immigration laws.

Whether the individual acquisition of nationality may amount to an abuse of law (abus de droit) is a highly controversial issue. States resort to the notion of abuse of rights in connection with marriages of convenience, evasion of tax obligations, acquisition of residence rights and the retention of dual nationality. Marriages of convenience have also been concluded to qualify either for automatic entitlement to nationality or facilitated access to naturalisation. New problems have surfaced concerning the recognition of registered partnerships entitling a person under national law to preferential access to nationality. Misuse may also occur through the legislation of certain states allowing a person claiming to be the father to recognise a child by a simple declaration, thereby establishing the parenthood relationship and transmitting nationality to a child (Walmsley 1999: 63).

The most prominent case in which an abuse of nationality has been argued is probably the Chen case.18 Mrs. Chen, in the absence of a residence right in the United Kingdom, planned to go to Ireland in order to give birth to her second child in Belfast, with a view to obtaining Irish nationality for her. She then settled with her child in the UK and claimed the right of residence for the child as a European citizen and for herself as the mother. The UK government contended that Mrs.

Chen was not entitled to rely on the Community provisions because her move to Northern Ireland with the aim of having her child acquire the nationality of another Member State would constitute an attempt to exploit the provisions of Community law. The aims pursued by those Community provisions are not, in the view of the UK government, served where a national of a non-Member country wishing to reside in a Member State, without however moving or wishing to move from one Member State to another, arranges matters in such a way as to give birth to a child in part of the host Member State to which an other Member State applies its rules governing acquisition of nationality iure soli. Member States therefore were entitled to take measures to prevent individuals from improperly taking advantage of the provisions of Community law or from attempting, under cover of the rights created by the Treaty, illegally to circumvent national legislation. The court rejected this argument. It observed that none of the parties had questioned the legality of the child's acquisition of Irish nationality. Therefore, Member States were not allowed to restrict the effects of the granting of nationality of another Member State by imposing an additional condition for recognition of that nationality with a view to the exercise of the fundamental freedoms provided for in the treaty. The count of fraudulent use of nationality law was not discussed. The advocate general examined the issue but stated that in this case, 'there has not been a distortion of the purposes and the objectives of the Community provision which grants the right in question'.

The theory of abuse of rights is based on the nineteenth century concept of a social function of rights (Reich 2001: 4, 21). In principle, the court has recognised that Community law cannot be relied on for purposes of abuse or fraud. The court, however, has not supplied any clearly identifiable criteria for determining abuse of rights.

It is generally up to the states to prevent misuse. International law does not exclude appropriate measures against the misuse of nationality laws. There may, however, be scope for increased international cooperation, particularly in order to exchange information about techniques of fraud and the presentation of false documents and registering the renunciation and acquisition of nationality.

General principles

The right of states to determine their own jurisdiction and who its nationals are can be considered a generally recognised principle of public international law (Brownlie 2003: 373; Berber 1975: 374; Randelzhofer 2000: 501, 502). The principle, first codified in art. 1 of the 1930 Convention on certain questions relating to the conflict of nationality laws, has been repeated in numerous standard works and court decisions. The leading case has been the advisory opinion of the Permanent Court of International Justice in its 1923 advisory opinion in nationality decrees, issued in Tunis and Morocco: 'The question whether a certain matter is or is not solely within the jurisdiction of a state is an essentially relative question. It depends upon the development of international relations. Thus, in the present state of international law, questions of nationality are, in the opinion of the Court, in principle reserved domain.'

General acceptance of the principle does not mean that the freedom of states to regulate their nationality is unlimited. Since nationality has many international aspects relating to diplomatic protection, international responsibility and personal sovereignty, limits are set by the rights of other states as well as human rights considerations. The first aspect has already been noted by the German government in its reply to the Territory Committee for the Hague Codification Conference 1930. The German government stated that the application of the principle that questions relating to the acquisition or loss of a specific nationality shall be governed by the laws of the state whose nationality is being claimed or contested, should not go beyond the limits where the legislation of one state encroaches upon the sovereignty of another. For example, a state has no power, through a law or administrative act, to confer its nationality on all the inhabitants of another state or on all foreigners entering its territory.

Further, if the state confers its nationality on the subjects of other states without their request, when the persons concerned are not attached to it by any particular bond, such as origin, domicile or birth for instance, the states concerned will not be bound to recognise such naturalisation.

Similarly, the British representative pointed to the restrictions imposed by duties which a state owes to other states. It follows that the right of a state to legislate with regard to the acquisition and loss of its nationality and the duty of another state to recognise the effects of such legislation are not necessarily coincident.

The approach taken by the British government was also taken up by the International Court of Justice in the Nottebohm case. Attempts to distinguish municipal law effects of nationality from the international effects of nationality may raise some questions as to whether these aspects can be separated. Nevertheless, the principle that a state is not completely free to choose criteria for the conferment of its nationality and that other states may not recognise such conferment is undisputed.

A second set of limitations follows from human rights considerations and related concepts even before human rights entered the sphere of public international law. The 1930 Hague Convention contained provisions on reducing statelessness. Expatriation, therefore, was not to result in denaturalisation, unless the person in question possessed or required another nationality; rules were laid down in subsequent international treaties and recommendations of the Council of Europe regarding the nationality of women as a consequence of marriage, dissolution of marriage or a change in their husband's nationality.

The rights of children of unknown or stateless parents and foundlings to receive the nationality of the state of birth or the state where they were found had already been laid down in the 1930 Hague Convention.

All these treaties and recommendations did to some extent influence existing international law on the acquisition of nationality although - as the European Convention on Nationality indicates – there is considerable divergence as to the rules and practices of the modes of acquisition as well as the loss of nationality.

Chapter 2 of the European Convention describing the general principles relating to nationality therefore very cautiously states that the rules on nationality of each state party shall be based on the following principles:

- everyone has the right to nationality,

- statelessness shall be avoided,

- no-one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his or her nationality,

- neither marriage nor the dissolution of a marriage between a national of a state party and an alien, nor a change in nationality by one of the spouses during the marriage shall automatically affect the nationality of the other spouse.

The Convention confirms the principle of sovereignty by stating in art. 3 that each state shall determine under its own law who are its nationals. This law shall be accepted by other states in so far as it is consistent with applicable international conventions, customary international law and the principles of law generally recognised with regard to nationality. The wording 'shall be based' is intended to indicate an obligation

to regard the principles as the basis for national rules on nationality. On the other hand, the principles are not to be taken as absolute. Their precise content is to be determined by more detailed rules laid down in the Convention and elsewhere. Therefore, concerning the right to a nationality, the Explanatory Report makes clear that the right to any particular nationality is determined by the rules on nationality of each state party, consistent with art. 3 of the Convention. 1.2.2 Acquisition by descent (iure sanguinis) or by birth on territory (iure soli)

Acquisition of nationality by descent from a national or by birth within state territory are the predominant modes of acquisition of nationality. Scarcely any dispute exists that the two criteria are sanctioned by customary international law as commonly recognised criteria which must be recognised by other states as bases for acquisition of nationality (see Panhuys 1959: 160; Brownlie 2003: 378). A survey of states' practice leads to the conclusion that the legal systems of states are based either on ius sanguinis or ius sanguinis along with ius soli. It seems that these criteria are not used interchangeably. There is no state which bases its nationality law exclusively on ius soli. The systems differ only to the extent to which ius soli or other criteria are accepted as equally valid modes of acquisition of nationality. The systems may also differ in terms of the extent to which birth abroad may limit the acquisition of nationality by descent.

The only exception seems to be the acquisition of nationality of the Vatican City state, where nationality is acquired only by holding office and residing in the Vatican City. The particular circumstances of this case are hardly suitable to refute the argument that there is a widespread acceptance of the principle of the acquisition of nationality of a child, one of whose parents possess the nationality of that state party at the time of the child's birth (art. 6, para. 1 ECN).

Although, originally, the rule in some systems had been limited to acquisition of the nationality of the father, with the development of rules on the prohibition of discrimination based on gender, the nationality laws of European states were uniformly adapted to the equal treatment requirement, extending the ius sanguinis principle to the mother of the child.

Problems may arise in cases of the acquisition of nationality in mixed marriages and concerning children born out of wedlock. The Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1081 regarding problems of nationality in mixed marriages40 recommends that children born from mixed marriages should also be entitled to require and keep the nationality of both of their parents. The 1998 Recommendation implies a certain change of attitude regarding the position taken eleven years earlier in the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers Resolution 7713.41 The Committee had recommended the insertion of provisions in national legislation for the purpose of avoiding dual nationality resulting either directly or indirectly from descent or resulting from the place of birth. States should grant the right to their nationals who hold another nationality to renounce their nationality and permit their nationals who acquire another nationality to make a declaration in favour of their new nationality. The different wording of the later Recommendation, as well as art. 14 of the European Convention on Nationality, indicate a shift of attitude towards acceptance of dual nationality by children having different nationalities acquired automatically at birth. Under art. 14, para. 1 ECN, state parties shall allow retention of these nationalities. No reservation so far seems to have been entered against this provision by any contracting state. Art. 6, para. 1 ECN does not distinguish between married and unmarried mothers concerning the acquisition of nationality by descent. The only exception is made for internal law restrictions as regards children born abroad. Whether, under the general principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of sex, the same applies to the father may be doubtful. Art. 6 already provides for a distinction with respect to children whose parenthood is established by recognition, court order or similar procedures. Each state party in this case may stipulate that the child acquires that nationality following the procedure determined by its internal law. Regarding this provision, Austria has declared that the term 'parent', used in art. 6 of the Convention, does not include the father of children born out of wedlock according to the Austrian legislation on nationality. While the requirement of a special procedure seems to be justified by the different conditions under which parenthood is established ('mater semper certa est') the total exclusion of a father with regard to the acquisition of nationality for children born out of wedlock seems to be a doubtful proposition in the light of art. 5 on non-discrimination.

Acquisition by birth on the territory (ius soli) is equally recognized as a criteria for the conferment of nationality. To varying degrees, the Nationality in public international law and european law laws of a large number of states rest on both principles. In Europe, ius soli as an additional reason for acquisition of nationality for second generation migrants has received growing support. The second protocol amending the 1963 Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality has introduced a rule whereby nationals of a contracting party, acquiring the nationality of another contracting party on whose territory they were either born and were resident or have been ordinarily resident for a certain period of time, may accept dual nationality.

Although the focus is on a broader acceptance of dual nationality, the protocol is based on the assumption that migrants who had settled permanently in the Member States of the Council of Europe, particularly in the case of second generation migrants, should acquire the nationality of the host state ex lege.

The rule, however, did not receive general approval and the second protocol was only ratified by a small number of contracting states. The European Convention on Nationality is somewhat more careful in providing that each state party shall 'facilitate' in its internal law the acquisition of its nationality for persons who were born on its territory and reside there lawfully and habitually - thus leaving it up to the states to either introduce ius soli or provide for naturalisation. An obligation to grant ex lege acquisition at birth is only provided for children born on the territory of a contracting state who do not acquire another nationality at birth (see art. 6, para. 2).

Conferment of nationality to persons born on territory in countries applying a general ius soli rule is not usually dependent upon the length of time a person has spent on the territory of birth of a child or upon the residence permit acquired. There are, however, certain limitations generally accepted in customary international law to the principle. One exception is the rule that children of persons with diplomatic immunity do not acquire the nationality of the state where they are born. The rule is applied to diplomats covered by the Vienna Convention on diplomatic relations of 18 April 1961, as well as to persons enjoying diplomatic immunity under the Vienna Convention on consular relations of 24 April 1963.42 Another exception is sometimes made with respect to the children of persons exercising official duties on behalf of a foreign government (see Brownlie 2003: 380). More recently, the tendency is towards somewhat limiting the application of the ius soli rule for persons having illegally entered the territory or having entered only for the purpose of a temporary stay. In reaction to the European Court's judgement in the Chen case discussed in section 1.3 above, Ireland, a traditional ius soli country, voted by a clear majority in a referendum for a restriction of the ius soli rule to persons possessing a residence permit.

States applying a ius soli concept sometimes also confer nationality ex lege on children born on vessels or aircraft flying their flag. It appears that the extension of ius soli to vessels or aircraft is a consequence of a somewhat obsolete concept of vessels and aircraft as the fictitious territory of the state whose flag they fly. It is difficult to see an actual link for conferring nationality since there is no genuine connection between the person born and the state. However, the same criticism could be made with regard to a temporary visit to a state in a globalised world with millions of travellers.

The ius soli concept is considered by some writers as a preferable system, relatively simple in outline. The principle may have had its justification in the nineteenth century and first half of the twentieth century since, in principle, only people intending to emigrate were travelling abroad and giving birth to children abroad (for a different view see Brownlie 2003: 379). In a highly mobile world, however, the mere fact of birth within the state territory, which may be either accidental or intentionally chosen by parents, and the mere purpose of 'nationality shopping' can hardly be considered a sufficient link for the attribution of nationality compared, for instance, to other criteria which are generally used for conferring nationality by naturalisation. However, there are no indications that the intentional use of nationality laws in order to acquire nationality during temporary or illegal residence does establish nationality that is invalid in international relations. In the Chen case, the European Court of Justice has confirmed that it is up to each Member State to determine the conditions for acquisition and loss of nationality. With respect to Community law, however, the reservation is that the competence of Member States is to be exercised with respect to the requirements of Community law. The Court was in no doubt that Irish nationality with effect for other Member States of the European Union had been acquired by the child of a Chinese national travelling to Ireland for the purpose of giving birth.

In line with the principle that each state shall determine, under its own law, who are its nationals, various other criteria are used in state practice and recognised by international law for the conferment of nationality.

Sometimes entry into state service will result in an acquisition of nationality ex lege. Sometimes nationality is also acquired automatically upon a change in civil status such as adoption, legitimisation, affiliation or marriage to a national of that state (see Randelzhofer 2000: 504). The European Convention, in art. 6, para. 4, does mention some of these categories in the context of a duty to facilitate the acquisition of nationality, leaving it, however, to the contracting states whether facilitation is to be achieved by naturalisation or by conferment ex lege.

With regard to the acquisition of nationality of spouses, the trend goes clearly against an automatic conferment of the nationality of the Nationality in public international law and european law other spouse. The Council of Europe Resolution of 1977 on the nationality of spouses of different nationalities44 has not only confirmed the principle of legal equality between the sexes which should lead to equal treatment of men and women with regard to the conditions under which one of the spouses can acquire the nationality of the other, but has also recommended the possibility for spouses who so wish to acquire the nationality, under a privileged procedure, of the husband or the wife. The principle that marriage does not result in an automatic change of nationality, which had never been applied to men, can now be considered a general principle of law. It is implicit in art. 6, para. 4 ECN.

Statelessness

The avoidance of statelessness is probably the oldest and most commonly recognised principle of nationality law. Prior to the recognition of the fact that nationality is an essential element of the possession of individual rights, states have recognised the need to avoid statelessness since unprotected stateless persons may feel obliged to move from the territory of one state to that of another state and therefore might become a burden for these states.62 In addition, statelessness raises questions of legal certainty and a clear attribution of responsibility in international relations.

The issue of statelessness has been of great concern to European states. A number of treaties deal with the legal status of stateless persons, as well as various recommendations by the Council of Europe, the most recent being the Recommendation no. R (99.18) on the avoidance and reduction of statelessness.63 Stateless persons have been defined by the Convention relating to the status of stateless persons of 28 September 1954, as well as by the 1961 UN Convention on the reduction of statelessness, as persons who are not considered as nationals by any state under the operation of its law. Persons may become stateless at birth or later, as a consequence of the loss of nationality. They may become stateless against their will or they may have renounced their nationality without having acquired a new nationality. Statelessness occasionally arises as a consequence of conflicting legislation. Generally speaking, a number of conventions contain obligations to avoid statelessness.

The Convention on the status of stateless persons as well as conventions such as the 1957 UN Convention on the status of married women, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 1966 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women and the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child all try to reduce cases of statelessness, particularly by providing for an obligation to grant nationality to a person who, under the operation of its regular provisions would otherwise be stateless. The treaties are binding upon only a restricted number of states and deal only with specific instances of statelessness with respect to special requirements and conditions.

Although it is correct to say that statelessness as such is not contrary to customary international law (Randelzhofer 2000: 508) the principle of avoiding statelessness laid down in art. 4 is enshrined in numerous international treaties and recommendations. Therefore, it seems correct to note that it has become part of customary international law.64 The European Convention contains a number of provisions which seek to prevent statelessness. Nationality under art. 6, para. 1 shall be acquired ex lege by foundlings found on the territory who would otherwise be stateless. In addition, state parties shall provide for the acquisition of nationality by children born on its territory who do not acquire another nationality by birth. Art. 6, para. 2 stipulates that the child concerned may submit an application for the acquisition of nationality. Nationality must be granted to children who remained stateless upon an application being lodged with the appropriate authority, by or on behalf of the child concerned. It can only be made subject to the lawful and habitual residence on the territory for a period not exceeding five years immediately preceding the lodging of the application. Facilitated acquisition of nationality must be provided in spite of the general freedom of states to regulate the nationality of stateless persons. Facilitation does not mean an unconditional duty, but implies that there must be more favourable conditions than for other persons resident on the territory. Recommendation no. R 99 of 15 September Nationality in public international law and european law 65 1999 of the Committee of Ministers describes a number of potential requirements in order to acquire nationality, including knowledge of language. The Recommendation indicates that, as far as stateless persons are concerned, an adequate knowledge of the language should be sufficient. This concept is regarded as relative and should be determined in accordance with the specific circumstances of the case. Oral knowledge of the language could be considered sufficient, the exact level, however, must be judged in the light of the social and economic conditions of the stateless person concerned as well as of his or her age and medical condition.

Regarding the criminal record, the Recommendation notes considerable differences in the states' practice. In the case of stateless persons, the Recommendation underlines the need to find a balance when evaluating a criminal record between the gravity of the offence committed and the negative consequence of statelessness (principle of proportionality).

Account has also to be taken of the need to respect the fundamental right of individuals to possess a nationality.

Persons who have deliberately become stateless, disregarding the principles of the ECN, shall not be entitled to acquire nationality in a facilitated manner.

The principle avoiding statelessness is also contained in the provisions on loss of nationality. Art. 7, para. 3 ECN stipulates that a state party may not provide in its internal law for the loss of its nationality if the person concerned would thereby become stateless. Statelessness is tolerated, however, when the nationality has been acquired by fraudulent conduct, false information or concealment of any relevant facts attributable to the applicant. The provision, therefore, goes further than that provided under art. 8 of the 1961 Convention on the reduction of statelessness. The principle is also contained in art. 8, para. 1, that each state party shall permit the renunciation of its nationality provided the persons concerned do not thereby become stateless.

Problems may arise where persons are allowed or required to renounce their nationality before they have acquired the nationality of another state. If the acquisition of nationality is subject to certain conditions which have not been fulfilled and the persons concerned fail to acquire the new nationality, the state whose nationality has been renounced

must allow them to recover their nationality or must regard them as never having lost it, in order to avoid statelessness.

In art. 18 on state succession and nationality, avoidance of statelessness is also mentioned as a general principle that must be respected in matters of nationality.

In conclusion, this principle is considered as a common European standard. It is reflected in a number of conventions and recommen­dations that have been codified in the European Convention on Nationality.

 

Население в международном праве.

Definition of population

1. 1a: the whole number of people or inhabitants in a country or region b: the total of individuals occupying an area or making up a whole c: the total of particles at a particular energy level —used especially of atoms in a laser

2. 2: the act or process of populating

3. 3a: a body of persons or individuals having a quality or characteristic in common b (1): the organisms inhabiting a particular locality (2): a group of interbreeding organisms that represents the level of organization at which speciation begins

4. 4: a group of individual persons, objects, or items from which samples are taken for statistical measurement

Population

A population is all the organisms of the same group or species, which live in a particular geographical area, and have the capability of interbreeding.

The area that is used to define a sexual population is defined as the area where inter-breeding is potentially possible between any pair within the area, and where the probability of interbreeding is greater than the probability of cross-breeding with individuals from other areas.

In sociology, population refers to a collection of humans. Demography is a social science which entails the statistical study of human populations. This article refers mainly to the human population.

World human population

As of today's date, the world's population is estimated by the United States Census Bureau to be 7.525 billion. The US Census Bureau estimates the 7 billion number was surpassed on 12 March 2012. According to a separate estimate by the United Nations, Earth’s population exceeded seven billion in October 2011, a milestone that offers unprecedented challenges and opportunities to all of humanity, according to UNFPA, the United Nations Population Fund.

According to papers published by the United States Census Bureau, the world population hit 6.5 billion on 24 February 2006. The United Nations Population Fund designated 12 October 1999 as the approximate day on which world population reached 6 billion. This was about 12 years after world population reached 5 billion in 1987, and 6 years after world population reached 5.5 billion in 1993. The population of countries such as Nigeria, is not even known to the nearest million, so there is a considerable margin of error in such estimates.

Researcher Carl Haub calculated that a total of over 100 billion people have probably been born in the last 2000 years.