Strategic environment within the Asia-Pacific region

Central and incentive factor of the geopolitical evolution of Asian-Pacific Region is China`s ascendancy. China`s geopolitical pattern generates a new regional process across the region, involving many regional nation-states, and as a steady growing power affecting its peripheral neighbors around its borders. Taking China`s in Asian geographical landmass [22, р. 10] it makes China central in the geopolitical processes occurring in Asian continent. Nowadays, the period after the end of cold war period, it has shifted a global military-political security issues and security parameters in Asia, which inherently is defined by the strategic and vital geopolitical areas for sustaining of American hegemony. As was mentioned by famous Harvard University professor Samuel P. Huntington in his work «The Clash of Civilizations and Remaking of World Order» in the new global political environment a challenge for US would be led from Political Islam and China. These two civilizational- geopolitical actors which would define a global agenda in various issues [37]. Sure these processes are profound in terms of historical transcendentalism for our time.

Since initiating Deng Xiaoping`s reform in the late of 1970s and declaring of Policy of Reforms and openness for outer world, China`s GDP has shown a steady and remarkable growth. During two decades of undeniable strength of its economic power, China in accordance with logic of realism has started to accumulate its power strength in other spheres. Realist logic proposes a step by step logic of development: accumulating of economic power leads to its financial strength. There are three main pillars of state`s power: economy, military and domestic political strength and stability. Since beginning of 90s and this process itself increased in the midst of 2000, People`s Liberation Army steady modernization process and ability to perform missions and operations in the new, strategic levels. But the issue of utility of military power is under the question in the contemporary conditions, due to global interdependence growth which is far away from classical system of previous international epochs. But nonetheless this radical changes and transformations do not deny the security dilemma issue in the Asia-Pacific. Third main political change is the building of China and its neighbor’s links in Asia. Here, in this part general issues are mixed with three directions: maritime disputes, especially over South China Sea, as a result of this arms race and issues of economic cooperation among state regions which is based on multilateral issues. Here, the near term perspective in the institutional framework agenda it`s a building of system of regional relations. The most actual agenda over Asian-Pacific is the building of regional institutions. Regional institutions itself in this context have a geopolitical pretext in the existence of types of political links in the region. The specific of regional institutions have two dimensional levels: first, diplomatic and legal in order to build a legally mechanisms that enforce the law of leading party and second - economic, the regulation of economic relations.    

Since China`s aggrandizement its power and shaping of new strategic environment in globe, there are many questions what kind of regional structure would be and what would accompany it?

China was by far the biggest and most important case of the liberal-authoritarian dilemma. In that period dominating idea in the context of ideological confrontation, liberal concept itself is on that market economy could not exist without democratic political institutions. In the light of this idea many thought and anticipated that economic changes eventually would entail political, i.e. liberalization of political system is inevitable. Possible China`s transition from authoritarian regime to democracy in terms of foreign policy and broadly in terms of geopolitics could to lower existing tenses and conflicts in the region and would contribute to stability and prosperity within the region. 

For China`s neighbors, the question resulting from all this was whether China would grow strong (and aggressive) or become more internally fragmented by uneven development, penetration of foreign capital and ideas, and a weakening political center. The combined impact of marketization (which stimulated mass internal migration, decentralization of power, challenge to authority, corruption, crime, environmental problems, and dangers of structural instability and overheated economic growth) and political uncertainty (succession struggles, loss of ideological authority, rise of nationalism) meant that the outcome of China`s rapid development during the 1980s and 1990s was very had to read. Impressive rates of economic growth, a willingness to increase military expenditure, and occasional forays into aggressive foreign policy all pointed towards China as a potential world-class power in the foreseeable future. But the profound internal contradictions of market communism, the tensions of uneven development between the coast and the interior, the uncertain state of the ruling CCP and its problems of leadership transition, and the widening gap between central and provincial political authority all pointed towards a potentially much more erratic future [62].

These open questions about the future of the political economies of East Asia`s two main powers had huge significance for all other levels of security dynamics. In principle, one could imagine sharply different scenarios for these two great powers within the next couple of decades. At worth, both could be military powerful and nationalistic. At best, both could be rich, democratic, and (to a point) liberal. Or both could remain in something like their present positions. How they would behave, not only towards each other, but also towards region and the world, hung on how their domestic political economies would develop. There was no way of predicting this, and not much consensus on the most likely outcome.

During the 1990s, the patterns of regional security interdependence in Asia underwent an external transformation because of the knitting together of Northeast and Southeast Asia into a single RSC. This knitting together of an East Asian RSC involved two main stories. The first was China-centered, and grew out of the Cold War and earlier security links between China and Southeast Asia.

The military-political story hinges on both the actual and expected rise of China`s power in a regional context that during the 1990s was less constrained by outside powers than at any time during the twentieth century.

The resulting enhancement of China`s weight and freedom of action in East Asia focused attention on its domestic developments, and what kind of state - it was likely to become. If China remained centralized and grew strong, then the question was whether it would be aggressive or benign. Some argued that it would be militarily incapable of serious aggression and its adaptation to international society. Attached to this were two ideas that seemed to amplify it. First was the idea of China as a revisionist power, not closely wedded to the existing international order, and with many territorial, cultural, and status grievances against (especially over Taiwan). Second was the idea that China was a classic model of authoritarian modernization, unrestrained by democracy and vulnerable to nationalism and militarism. Reinforcing these views was China`s continued willingness to resort to aggressive behavior and to the threat or use of force against its neighbors - India, Philippines, Taiwan - and its continued cultivation of historical hatred of Japan. In support of this malign views were China`s cavalier attitude towards nuclear testing and the export of missile and nuclear technology to Pakistan and Iran, and the gathering reaction against its unfair and inhumane economic and political practices. Its behavior in the South China Sea, and towards Taiwan, offered a distinctly mixed prospect to those hoping that China could somehow be brought into the regional process of dialogue and diplomacy.

Political expectations from China during 1990s and political expectations from 2000s.           

The Chinese military extended their occupations to the more southerly Spratly Islands in 1992, occupying atolls and asserting claims to continental shelf resources, and in 1994 occupied the Mischief Reef, long claimed by the Philippines though not occupied by it. The main vehicle for this reorientation has been the ARF, which came into being in 1994. Japan played a significant role in this development, though eschewing leadership for itself or having its bids turned down. The ARF usefully binds both Japan and China into a regional institutional framework, allowing Japan to address its historical problem, China to address the fears of its neighbors, and both to avoid conspicuous balancing behavior towards each other.

In sum, the case for an emergent East Asian security complex rests on three parallel developments.

•   First, a shared concern throughout Northeast and Southeast Asia, about the implications of growing Chinese power.

•   Second, the creation, albeit partial and fragile, of institutional security connections linking Northeast and Southeast Asian states.

•   Third, the build-up of an East Asian regional economy, which is widely thought within the region to have strong links to politico-military stability.

    An examination of a range of possible geopolitical futures for Strategic Asia and an evaluation of the likelihood of each outcome based on the prospective performance of the U.S. and Chinese economies, potential political reform in China, and other factors. Future shape of Strategic Asia will be determined in large part by the power and preference of its two biggest players. If China`s economy falters, the U.S. will remain dominant in at least the eastern portion of this various domain. If the U.S. stumbles, on the other hand, the chances of Chinese hegemony will grow. If both powers remain strong and engaged, Strategic Asia will likely be split along geographic and ideological lines.

The probability of other scenarios will depend on factors that lie outside the realm of normal geopolitical calculation. It is much easier to imagine the U.S. and China collaborating to keep order in Asia if they share the same democratic values and institutions. Similarly, an East Asian community modeled on the European Union is more likely if China liberalizes than if it does not. The geostrategic future of Asia will depend on whether China continues to rise, whether the U.S. retains the economic resources and on the choices and preferences of the two powers. Current trends suggest that Chinese hegemony or the division of the region into continental and maritime spheres of influence is most likely. Given the unlikelihood that China will undergo significant political reform in the near future, the U.S. must craft its regional strategy without continuing on a liberal regional partner.

Serious analysis of the international politics of specific regions, and of the world as a whole, must begin with a consideration of the distribution of hard power. It cannot end there, however. Instead of being fixed, the power balance is constantly changing, sometimes rapidly, thanks to differences in economic growth rates, levels of technological sophistication, and military expenditures. Albeit to varying degrees, these are variables over which national decisionmakers generally have at least some measure of control. The shifting the structure of power shapes the parameters within which states must act, setting limits on what they can achieve and creating imperatives that they ignore at their peril. How quickly and in precisely what ways states react to changing material conditions will depend on their goals and strategies. These, in turn, are the product of a variety of tangible and intangible factors, including the perceptions of key individuals, the power of various societal groups, the domestic political regimes within which they operate, and the content of prevailing ideologies.

The region (Asia) as a whole has continued to grow faster than rest of the world, with the result that its share of global GDP has increased from 33% in 2000 to nearly 40% in 2010.Within Asia itself, China and India remained the growth leaders, with their GDPs advancing at an average annual rate of 9.9% and 7.3%, respectively, between 2000 and 2009, and increasing from a combined total of 34% of the region`s total output in 2000 to 48% in 2010. Thanks to largely an increase in oil prices, Russia managed to hold onto its share of world GDP (growing slightly over the course of the decade from 2.7% to 3.0%), while Japan`s position continued to weaken (its GDP share falling from 7.6% to just under 6%). Both Russia and Japan also entered into what is likely to be an irreversible absolute drop in population, with unfavorable portents for their future prosperity, dynamism, and strength [69] The essential continuity of the region`s economic trend lines, in spite of political upheaval, suggests that they are being driven by deeply rooted demographic and technological forces.

China`s continuing growth has enabled the country to conduct a wide-ranging and rapid modernization of its armed forces and defense industrial base that, in terms of the burden imposed on the national economy, has been all but painless. Whereas at the turn of century it was still commonplace to observe that China`s jets, tanks, ships, and submarines lagged several generations behind those of the United States, the gap in many areas begun to close. More worrisome is the recognition, that China has also been pursuing asymmetric approaches to deterring and defeating potential enemies by developing anti-satellite weapons, large numbers of precision-guided conventional ballistic missiles, and cyber warfare techniques that could prove disproportionately costly and difficult for the United States and its allies to counter.

Economic growth has also given Beijing a variety of tools that it previously lacked, including the ability to promise (or threaten to withhold) aid, investment capital, access to China`s massive market for energy and raw materials, and its seemingly limitless supply of inexpensive labor. In recent years Beijing has become more subtle and sophisticated in using of all these instruments of soft power to enhance its influence and shape its strategic environment. In addition, the mere fact of China`s obvious economic success has boosted its prestige around the world, and its ability to combine growth with authoritarianism has encouraged the perception in some quarters that China provides a workable alternative to Western models of liberal democratic capitalism.

Adherents of «realist» theories of international politics believe that institutions reflect the power and preferences of the nations that make them up rather than any shared commitment to lofty abstract principles. The process of institutional design generally involves political struggle among the potential participants, with each pursing for the plan that best serves its own interest. Such struggle is clearly visible just beneath the surface of recent discussions of a possible East Asian community, with China, Japan, and the United States all trying to shape whatever may ultimately emerge. Not surprisingly, Beijing has tended to favor mechanisms such as ASEAN + 3, in which China would be biggest and most powerful member. Japan, meanwhile, has advanced proposals in which China`s strength would be offset by the addition of other major players (including at a minimum, India, Australia, and New Zealand). The United States has made clear its preference for open, pan-Pacific organizations as opposed to or to put itself in a position where it might seem to be actively opposing the wishes of a substantial group of Asian nations.

As a rising power with expanding ambitions, China has little to gain by locking itself into arrangements that will restrict its future freedom of action or give the United States a perpetual voice in the affairs of the region. Conversely, the weaker powers (especially Japan, but also South Korea and Australia, among others) will be wary of joining organizations that a powerful, opaque China can easily dominate.

Compared to Europe at the close of the Cold War, Asia today remains divided by ideology, history, the lack of any prior experience of regional integration, and a absence of a trusted arbiter and guarantor. The fact that China is authoritarian as well as strong still matters. The regime`s lack of transparency, the absence of any internal checks on its power, and the degree to which the CCP is closed to outside influence make China far more difficult for others to trust than it would be if it were a democracy. In contrast to Germany, Japan`s failure to come to terms adequately with its past, coupled with the CCP`s deliberate efforts to keep Tokyo off balance and alienated from Japan`s other neighbors, has helped to keep the history issue very much alive. Even though several East Asian states maintain strong strategic connections to the United States as part of the latter`s hub-and spokes system, they have never been integrated into anything resembling a true multilateral alliance, and, of course, throughout the Cold War China, Russia, and India remained in orbits of their own. The fact that the United States would not even be a full member of some proposed organizations means that there would be no one to play honest broker, a role that, in any event, China would be exceedingly unlikely to grant [23].

This issue on building of multilateral relations in East Asia under the question. Facts itself propose dominant two models: Sino centric based on bilateral relations and rested on traditional Oriental political model and American in the face of balance of power in economic sense of the TPP.               

In order for China to displace the United States as the pole around which Asia is organized, several things would have to happen. First, and most obviously, Beijing would need to find a way to sidestep all the various obstacles just identified and continue on its path of rapid economic and military expansion. Second, the United States would either have to choose or be compelled against its will to withdraw substantially from the region, pulling back its forward-based forces and allowing its alliances and quasi-alliance relationships to be dissolved or drained of any real strategic significance. Third, Beijing would need to find ways to prevent other regional actors from joining together in the absence of the United States to form a countervailing coalition capable of balancing China`s power and challenging its influence.

While it might seem implausible that all these conditions could be achieved simultaneously, they may turn out to be linked in ways that would be achieved simultaneously, they may turn out to be linked in ways that would make them mutually reinforcing. Suppose that China is able to sustain its rapid growth while the United States struggles economically in the wake of the recent financial crisis and remains bogged down in costly counter terrorism and counter insurgency operations in Southwestern Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. Public opinion polls already show more support for disengagement, if not outright isolationism, that at any time since the end of Vietnam War. The American people are way of China, but they give no indication of wanting to enter into a costly arms race or to compete with China for influence in Asia. To the contrary, they seem at present far more inclined toward tending to their own problems than going out into the world seeking dragons to slay [23, р. 31].

Reveling interim narrowly in Sino-American relations and broadly within regional relations in Asia-Pacific became second decade of XXI century. Sustaining American hegemony despite Republican hawks within the US government domination or restrained Democrats, after Obama`s administration initiating «Pivot to Asia» it became clear that American engagement in Asia-Pacific is inevitable. Regional strategic conditions will be formed under American presence and its active engagement. This event sure in favor for ASEAN nations who seek a counterbalancing Chinese assertive aspirations in solving of local affairs. Next notion and common object in strategic links between two leading geopolitical actors - it`s a perception of American «rebalancing» strategy.