North Korean Military Strategy ( Перевод )

    North Korea appears determined to maintain its “songun” policy of putting its military first, as well as its “byungjin” line of striving for economic developments while also building nuclear weapons. North Korea’s desire to strengthen its deterrent posture has enabled continued military investment despite severe economic conditions throughout the country. The DPRK maintains a military comprising 1.2 million personnel, including 1 million in the army, 60,000 in the navy, and 120,000 in the air force. The ROK 2014 Defense White Paper estimates North Korea fields 74 maneuver brigades consisting of 4,300 tanks, 2,500 armored vehicles, 8,600 cannons, and 5,500 multiple rocket launchers.42 The navy reportedly possesses 430 combatant vessels, 260 amphib- ious ships, 20 mine warfare vessels, and 70 submarines. The air force fields 820 combat aircraft, 30 surveillance and control aircraft, 330 transport craft, 170 trainers, and 300 helicopters. North Korea has one of the world’s largest special operations forces, estimated at 60,000 to 180,000.

    Total reservists are assessed at over 7 million. While these numbers sound forbidding, the qual- ity of the forces are low and deemed to have deteriorated due to poor training, food shortages, dilapidated equipment, and lack of fuel. Nevertheless, artillery remains a major threat given its proximity to Seoul. DPRK submarine forces also pose a danger in the northwest islands and to ROK surface vessels as evidenced by North Korea’s torpedoing of the Cheonan corvette in 2010, which killed 46 South Korean sailors in the largest military loss of life on the peninsula since the Korean War.

    North Korea has focused resources on the development of asymmetric capabilities. It conducted nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, and 2013, all at the same test site. Preparations continue at this site, and North Korea could conduct a fourth test with little warning.43 In recent years, Pyongyang has augmented its plutonium-based weapons program with a new and clandestine program based on highly enriched uranium. There is little information available on this second program, but in February 2015, Chinese scientists reportedly estimated that North Korea currently has 20 nuclear weapons. They also estimated that Pyongyang possesses the uranium-enrichment capacity to build 40 weapons by the end of the Obama administration’s term. This is higher than the West- ern estimate of 8–16 weapons.44

    North Korea currently has over 700 ballistic missiles and is actively seeking an intercontinen- tal missile capable of carrying a warhead to the continental United States. In January 2011, then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates estimated this could happen within five years.45 In May 2015, North Korea claimed it is now capable of mounting a miniaturized nuclear warhead on a long-range ballistic missile targeting the United States. DPRK short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and long-range artillery can reach every U.S. base in Japan and South Korea. The regime also possesses one of the largest chemical weapon stockpiles in the world.46 The March 2013 cyber intrusion against South Korean banks and television stations and the November 2014 hack of Sony Pictures demonstrate North Korea’s growing asymmetric capabilities.

    In addition to the risk of conventional or nuclear attack on its neighbors, North Korea also pres- ents an instability risk, with the potential for a rapid collapse of centralized state control. Kim Jong-un faces the dictator’s dilemma—the state must open up to survive, but the process of opening up could lead to the collapse of the regime.47 There is credible evidence that the po- tential for a dramatic erosion of regime control is possible. The leadership is incapable of reform and opening up to market transactions with the outside world and accepting information inflows would erode the legitimacy of the regime and collapse the system. On the other hand, main- taining the status quo is not sustainable in the long term. The numbers of refugees continues to grow, the economy remains underdeveloped, and China’s generosity in making up for the DPRK’s flaws is not eternal. Moreover, Kim Jong-un’s tightening of political control over the country is

in juxtaposition to a society that is more knowledgeable of the outside world, less dependent on the state as a result of two decades of informal and official markets, and desirous of a better life. Rigid political structures and a liberalizing society is an unworkable combination. We do not know what the trigger will be, but this system cannot continue indefinitely.

    Thus, the bottom line is that Korean unification is not a matter of if, but when. A collapse of regime control, however, would immediately create major security challenges. The refugee flow both north and south would be substantial, requiring a massive humanitarian assistance pro- gram. North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technology would also need to be secured. Moreover, geopolitical tensions would arise between visions of a united Korea closely aligned with China and one that remains allied with the United States. These tensions would erupt in the midst of a highly uncertain crisis, requiring quick reaction and careful coordination between political and military leaders throughout the region.

The United States will have to work closely with regional allies and partners to address Pyong- yang’s nuclear program, missile development, and illicit activities, as well as the risk of an internal collapse of regime control. Managing escalation in such contingencies will be vital not only with North Korea but also with other regional states like China and Russia.

 

 

                                    Regional context

    North Korea occupies a Central place in the parameters of the security system of the Far East. The dynamics of regional security issues in the context of the DPRK cover directly the security issues of South Korea, Japan, the United States, and indirectly Russia and China.

    China's position on North Korea is complex. China generally supports maintaining a stable political situation in the Asia-Pacific region and is not interested in increasing military escalation. China faces two options in resolving the North Korean dilemma: on the one hand, maintaining North Korea's statehood is necessary to maintain a buffer with Pro-American South Korea. On the other hand, the threat to the DPRK is to provoke the US to military action. Also, in the event of hostilities, China will Express a strong protest about the large us military presence near its North-Eastern borders, which, in turn, may lead to an increase in Sino-American tensions. If the regime of Kim Jong-UN is eliminated, China will be "squeezed" by the US on the Korean Peninsula, in the region of the South China sea and the Taiwan Strait within the Asia-Pacific region. Beijing will be satisfied with maintaining the regime of Kim Jong-UN with subsequent economic reforms that will help preserve regional stability. If the leadership of the DPRK decides to liberalize the economy, China will certainly become one of the leading investors in the North Korean economy. Reaching an agreement between the US and the DPRK will have direct consequences for the security of South Korea. As noted by South Korean President moon Jae-In, Seoul welcomes the second round of the summit, although it is noteworthy that South Korea is not a participant in the negotiations. If the North Korean nuclear potential is eliminated, the permanent threat to South Korea will disappear, which in turn may affect the state and prospects of the American military contingent on the Korean Peninsula. However, if the negotiations are successful, the security of South Korea will be achieved, which will be guaranteed by the absence of the DPRK's nuclear potential itself. If the summit is completed successfully, the significance of the military aspect of the Korean Peninsula issue will be leveled. Despite the fact that the issue of unification is the Central agenda of the Peninsula, we should not expect any drastic changes in this issue. North and South Korea will maintain their political sovereignty, even though relations have improved.

    Japan also views the DPRK as a source of threat to its national security. In General, Japan supports holding the DPRK-US summit and attempts to improve relations between the countries. Japan puts its priorities on resolving the following issues: the return of its citizens who were kidnapped by North Korean intelligence in the 70s and 80s, the elimination of nuclear weapons, and improving economic ties with the DPRK. For Japan, it is crucial to eliminate North Korea's nuclear potential, which is a threat in the form of a counter-value strike on civilian infrastructure, since in the case of a hypothetical conflict, Japan also becomes a hostage to the DPRK's retaliatory strike. As noted by Mitoji Yabunaka, a former representative of the Japanese side for the six-party talks, Japan expresses a number of doubts about the success of the negotiations, which can be "half-baked, deceptive agreements". Japan also considers the US military contingent on the Korean Peninsula as a deterrent to the growth of China's military potential. Therefore, the range of Japanese-American relations is not limited exclusively to the issue of a nuclear missile attack by the DPRK, but also to the military factor of China.

    If positive results of the negotiation process are achieved, Japan can start providing appropriate economic support to the DPRK. Thus, secret negotiations are being held between the parties on the return of kidnapped Japanese citizens to their homeland. Japan will continue to support Washington's diplomatic efforts to achieve peace on the Korean Peninsula.

    Russia is one of the North's allies, which provides diplomatic and moral assistance, especially within the UN Security Council. A military confrontation between the DPRK and the U.S. and its allies does not represent a direct threat to the security of the Russian Federation in the far East, but nevertheless, the Russian diplomatic strategy will focus either on maintaining the status quo, either for economic transformation of the DPRK by Vietnamese or Chinese script. Although there is no threat of a military confrontation between Russia and the United States in the Far East, in the event of increased military escalation in the region, the Russian foreign Ministry will protest with the increased presence of the US armed forces in the region. Therefore, Russia is interested in a peaceful settlement of the DPRK and the United States.

 

Отношения КНДР и Китая

 

    For North Korea, the lifeline provided by China is paramount to its existence. Without China, the North Korean economy would cease to function; China provides for approximately 70 percent of North Korea’s total trade.10 North Korea’s mineral exports to China have been a major source of hard currency for its impoverished economy. As the largest importer of North Korean mineral products, China has participated in 20 North Korean 7. mining projects and remains Pyongyang’s leading mining project investor.11 North Korea’s anthracite coal is its major export item; China is the sole recipient.12 North Korea’s anthracite exports to China increased 15.5 percent in 2013 compared to the previous year, with shipments totaling US$1.37 billion.13 Although North Koreans bristle at Chinese treatment of them like a poor province, dictating the terms of all interactions, they have little choice given their isolated and dependent state. Pyongyang’s continued nuclear and missile tests in the face of Chinese opposition have been an embarrassment to the Chinese leadership, with frustration growing in Beijing. In response to a North Korean nuclear test in February 2013, China summoned North Korea’s ambassador to communicate Beijing’s strong dissatisfaction. The execution of Jang Sungthaek in December 2013 further shocked Chinese government offi cials as Jang was China’s main interlocutor and was regarded as a promoter of economic reform in North Korea. Thus far, Beijing has not doubled down on its North Korean stakes by embracing the young leader Kim Jong- un who has yet to pay a visit to China. But it is not clear how long China can tolerate losing its main contact inside the regime, with no evidence of a replacement. North Korea and China’s historical ties, combined with both countries’ strategic and security interests, create a partnership that cannot be easily broken. Despite the noticeable and growing strains in the bilateral relationship, China continues to support and maintain its relations with North Korea because of its strategic signifi cance. However, cracks have slowly begun to emerge. These cracks in the relationship provide an opportunity for South Korea to further engage with China and shape Beijing’s policies toward Pyongyang.