Mr Christopher Greenwood (Professor of International Law, London School of Economics)

http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ls/Greenwood_IL_video_2.html

 

II. Answer the questions.

1. How can the term “customary international law” be defined?

2. What are the two elements of custom?

3. What names can treaties have?

4. Is treaty a source of law or a source of obligation?

5. Is treaty an evidence of custom?

III. Further listening.

Lecture “The Sources of International Law”

Mr. Anthony D’Amato, Judd and Mary Morris Leighton Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law

http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ls/D-Amato_IL_video_2.html

UNIT II

SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. PART II

LEAD-IN

I. Read the following quotation and comment on it:

“We look to a number of sources to ascertain principles of international law, including international conventions, international customs, treatises, and judicial decisions rendered in all the countries” (The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700, 20 S.Ct. 290, 299, 44 L.Ed. 320 (1900)).

READING

I. Before you read: What do you suppose the sources of international law are to be?

II. Read through the text and find answers to the questions that follow it:

 

SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Article 38 (1) of the ICJ’s statute identifies three sources of international law:

-treaties

-custom

-general principles

Treaties

Treaties are known by a variety of terms—conventions, agreements, pacts, general acts, charters, and covenants—all of which signify written instruments in which the participants (usually but not always states) agree to be bound by the negotiated terms. Some agreements are governed by municipal law (e.g., commercial accords between states and international enterprises), in which case international law is inapplicable. Informal, nonbinding political statements or declarations are excluded from the category of treaties.

Treaties may be bilateral or multilateral. Treaties with a number of parties are more likely to have international significance, though many of the most important treaties (e.g., those emanating from Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) have been bilateral. A number of contemporary treaties, such as the Geneva Conventions (1949) and the Law of the Sea treaty (1982; formally the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea), have more than 150 parties to them, reflecting both their importance and the evolution of the treaty as a method of general legislation in international law. Other significant treaties include the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948), the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961), the Antarctic Treaty (1959), and the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (1998). Whereas some treaties create international organizations and provide their constitutions (e.g., the UN Charter of 1945), others deal with more mundane issues (e.g., visa regulations, travel arrangements, and bilateral economic assistance).

Countries that do not sign and ratify a treaty are not bound by its provisions. Nevertheless, treaty provisions may form the basis of an international custom in certain circumstances, provided that the provision in question is capable of such generalization or is “of a fundamentally norm-creating character,” as the ICJ termed the process in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases (1969). A treaty is based on the consent of the parties to it, is binding, and must be executed in good faith. The concept known by the Latin formula pacta sunt servanda (“agreements must be kept”) is arguably the oldest principle of international law. Without such a rule, no international agreement would be binding or enforceable. Pacta sunt servanda is directly referred to in many international agreements governing treaties, including the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), which concerns treaties between states, and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or Between International Organizations (1986).

There is no prescribed form or procedure for making or concluding treaties. They may be drafted between heads of state or between government departments. The most crucial element in the conclusion of a treaty is the signaling of the state’s consent, which may be done by signature, an exchange of instruments, ratification, or accession. Ratification is the usual method of declaring consent—unless the agreement is a low-level one, in which case a signature is usually sufficient. Ratification procedures vary, depending on the country’s constitutional structure.

Treaties may allow signatories to opt out of a particular provision, a tactic that enables countries that accept the basic principles of a treaty to become a party to it even though they may have concerns about peripheral issues. These concerns are referred to as “reservations,” which are distinguished from interpretative declarations, which have no binding effect. States may make reservations to a treaty where the treaty does not prevent doing so and provided that the reservation is not incompatible with the treaty’s object and purpose. Other states may accept or object to such reservations. In the former case, the treaty as modified by the terms of the reservations comes into force between the states concerned. In the latter case, the treaty comes into force between the states concerned except for the provisions to which the reservations relate and to the extent of the reservations. An obvious defect of this system is that each government determines whether the reservations are permissible, and there can be disagreement regarding the legal consequences if a reservation is deemed impermissible.

A set of rules to interpret treaties has evolved. A treaty is expected to be interpreted in good faith and in accordance with the ordinary meanings of its terms, given the context, object, and purpose of the treaty. Supplementary means of interpretation, including the use of travaux pr?paratoires (French: “preparatory works”) and consideration of the circumstances surrounding the conclusion of the treaty, may be used when the treaty’s text is ambiguous. In certain cases, a more flexible method of treaty interpretation, based on the principle of effectiveness (i.e., an interpretation that would not allow the provision in question to be rendered useless) coupled with a broader-purposes approach (i.e., taking into account the basic purposes of the treaty in interpreting a particular provision), has been adopted. Where the treaty is also the constitutional document of an international organization, a more programmatic or purpose-oriented approach is used in order to assist the organization in coping with change. A purpose-oriented approach also has been deemed appropriate for what have been described as “living instruments,” such as human rights treaties that establish an implementation system; in the case of the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950, this approach has allowed the criminalization of homosexuality to be regarded as a violation of human rights in the contemporary period despite the fact that it was the norm when the treaty itself was signed.

A treaty may be terminated or suspended in accordance with one of its provisions (if any exist) or by the consent of the parties. If neither is the case, other provisions may become relevant. If a material breach of a bilateral treaty occurs, the innocent party may invoke that breach as a ground for terminating the treaty or suspending its operation. The termination of multilateral treaties is more complex. By unanimous agreement, all the parties may terminate or suspend the treaty in whole or in part, and a party specially affected by a breach may suspend the agreement between itself and the defaulting state. Any other party may suspend either the entire agreement or part of it in cases where the treaty is such that a material breach will radically change the position of every party with regard to its obligations under the treaty. The ICJ, for example, issued an advisory opinion in 1971 that regarded as legitimate the General Assembly’s termination of the mandate for South West Africa. A breach of a treaty is generally regarded as material if there is an impermissible repudiation of the treaty or if there is a violation of a provision essential to the treaty’s object or purpose.

The concept of rebus sic stantibus (Latin: “things standing thus”) stipulates that, where there has been a fundamental change of circumstances, a party may withdraw from or terminate the treaty in question. An obvious example would be one in which a relevant island has become submerged. A fundamental change of circumstances, however, is not sufficient for termination or withdrawal unless the existence of the original circumstances was an essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty and the change radically transforms the extent of obligations still to be performed. This exception does not apply if the treaty establishes a boundary or if the fundamental change is the result of a breach by the party invoking it of an obligation under the treaty or of any other international obligation owed to any other party to the treaty.

Custom

The ICJ’s statute refers to “international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law,” as a second source of international law. Custom, whose importance reflects the decentralized nature of the international system, involves two fundamental elements: the actual practice of states and the acceptance by states of that practice as law. The actual practice of states (termed the “material fact”) covers various elements, including the duration, consistency, repetition, and generality of a particular kind of behaviour by states. All such elements are relevant in determining whether a practice may form the basis of a binding international custom. The ICJ has required that practices amount to a “constant and uniform usage” or be “extensive and virtually uniform” to be considered binding. Although all states may contribute to the development of a new or modified custom, they are not all equal in the process. The major states generally possess a greater significance in the establishment of customs. For example, during the 1960s the United States and the Soviet Union played a far more crucial role in the development of customs relating to space law than did the states that had little or no practice in this area. After a practice has been established, a second element converts a mere usage into a binding custom—the practice must be accepted as opinio juris sive necessitatis (Latin: “opinion that an act is necessary by rule of law”). In the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the ICJ stated that the practice in question must have “occurred in such a way as to show a general recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is involved.”

Once a practice becomes a custom, all states in the international community are bound by it whether or not individual states have expressly consented—except in cases where a state has objected from the start of the custom, a stringent test to demonstrate. A particular practice may be restricted to a specified group of states (e.g., the Latin American states) or even to two states, in which cases the standard for acceptance as a custom is generally high. Customs can develop from a generalizable treaty provision, and a binding customary rule and a multilateral treaty provision on the same subject matter (e.g., the right to self-defense) may exist at the same time.

General principles of law

A third source of international law identified by the ICJ’s statute is “the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.” These principles essentially provide a mechanism to address international issues not already subject either to treaty provisions or to binding customary rules. Such general principles may arise either through municipal law or through international law, and many are in fact procedural or evidential principles or those that deal with the machinery of the judicial process—e.g., the principle, established in Chorzow Factory (1927–28), that the breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make reparation. Accordingly, in the Chorzow Factory case, Poland was obliged to pay compensation to Germany for the illegal expropriation of a factory.

Perhaps the most important principle of international law is that of good faith. It governs the creation and performance of legal obligations and is the foundation of treaty law. Another important general principle is that of equity, which permits international law to have a degree of flexibility in its application and enforcement. The Law of the Sea treaty, for example, called for the delimitation on the basis of equity of exclusive economic zones and continental shelves between states with opposing or adjacent coasts.

Other sources

Article 38 (1) of the ICJ’s statute also recognizes judicial decisions and scholarly writings as subsidiary means for the determination of the law. Both municipal and international judicial decisions can serve to establish new principles and rules. In municipal cases, international legal rules can become clear through their consistent application by the courts of a number of states. A clearer method of law determination, however, is constituted by the international judicial decisions of bodies such as the ICJ at The Hague, the UN International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea at Hamburg (Germany), and international arbitral tribunals.

International law can arise indirectly through other mechanisms. UN General Assembly resolutions, for example, are not binding—except with respect to certain organizational procedures—but they can be extremely influential. Resolutions may assist in the creation of new customary rules, both in terms of state practice and in the process of establishing a custom by demonstrating the acceptance by states of the practice “as law” (the opinio juris). For this to occur, a resolution must contain generalizable provisions and attract substantial support from countries with diverse ideological, cultural, and political perspectives. Examples of such resolutions include the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (1960), the Declaration on the Legal Principles Governing Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space (1963), and the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States (1970).

Unilateral actions by a state may give rise to legal obligations when it is clear that the state intends to be bound by the obligation and when its intention is publicly announced. An example of such a case was France’s decision to stop atmospheric nuclear testing during litigation at the ICJ between it and Australia and New Zealand (1974) concerning the legality of such testing. Unilateral statements also may constitute evidence of a state’s views on a particular issue. Even when an instrument or document does not entail a legal obligation, it may be influential within the international community. The Helsinki Accords (1975), which attempted to reduce tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War, was expressly not binding but had immense political effects. In certain areas, such as environmental law and economic law, a range of recommendations, guidelines, codes of practice, and standards may produce what is termed “soft law”—that is, an instrument that has no strict legal value but constitutes an important statement.