Communication May Be Dealt with in Intentional Terms

The Intentional framework I have outlined for communication (as well as for cognition at large) may seem empirically unwarranted from the start (see also the discussion in "Intentionality and Intentional Primitives"). While it is an obvious fact that beliefs and intentions cannot be ob­served, however, it may be remarked that the same is true of all the theoretical entities of classi­cal cognitive science: mental models, visuospatial sketchpads, and universal grammars are no more directly observable than beliefs and intentions. The explanatory framework is a matter of initial choice and scientific results, and I have already argued that the Intentional one is particu­larly fitting for the description of complex agent/world interactions, including communication. The real problems arise instead when one tries to develop a specific theory within the explana­tory framework one has chosen.

Thus, the issue is not to prove that mental states exist, but to understand what they are, what Intentional primitives make up the cognitive architecture that our species has evolved, which of them are involved in each specific type of agent/world interactions, and how.

The work of Bara, Tirassa & Zettin (1997) is, at least to my knowledge, the only one in empirical pragmatics that takes an explicitly Intentional standpoint. In this perspective, it seems to me to fare rather well. As said in the previous section, we were able to find a reliable trend in the respective difficulty of several pragmatic phenomena and, in general, most of our predic­tions were confirmed by the data. What is important here is that these predictions had been drawn from an Intentionality-based theory of communication and with no more recourse to in­trospection than is usual in psychology or neuropsychology.

Communication Requires Specific Intentional Primitives

This issue relates to the possibility of testing specific predictions based on different Intentional theories of the same pragmatic phenomenon and may be viewed as an extension and reformula­tion of what has been said so far in this section.

Some of the predictions in Bara, Tirassa & Zettin (1997) depended crucially on our theoreti­cal position that shared beliefs and communicative intentions are among the Intentional primi­tives necessary for communication. These predictions regarded in particular irony and deceits and were all confirmed; that is, the corresponding parts of the theory were not falsified.

As for the actual cognitive dynamic involved in communication, our predictions on direct vs indirect speech acts were grounded in Airenti, Bara & Colombetti's (1993) account of the con­versation game. We found no evidence that direct speech acts (like "Close the window") are easier to understand than the corresponding indirect ones (like "Can you close the window?"). The only reasonable explanation of our data was that there is no such thing as a direct speech act, that is, that the comprehension of the literal meaning of an utterance — provided that an utterance has a literal meaning, a postulate that is in itself questionable — is never sufficient for the comprehension of its pragmatic meaning.

These data were thus in agreement with our theory, but contrasted with the previous neu-ropsychological literature on the topic (see Stemmer, 1994, for a critical review) that subscribed instead to Searle's (1979) classic view that "direct" speech acts require no processing beyond the comprehension of the literal meaning and are therefore easier to understand than "indirect" ones.

 

Методика 2. Выявление наиболее значимых для ребенка понятий и представлений о природе и обществе (проводится индивидуально с каждым ребенком).

Цель. Определить уровень значимости экологических понятий для ребенка.

Инструкция к проведению. Педагог предлагает ребенку выбрать наиболее подходящий для него вариант ответа.

- Для нашего аквариума ты бы хотел завести новых рыбок:

А) с красивой окраской?

Б) С интересным поведением?

- Гуляя в лесу с родителями ты пойдешь:

А) Проложишь новую дорожку, зато нарвешь красивый букет?

Б) По хорошей тропинке, не вредя растениям?

- После отдыха с родными в лесу ты:

А) Оставишь мусор там, ведь и так его много вокруг?

Б) Попытаешься собрать мусор и вместе с родителями выбросишь его потом в урну?

- Какие цветы ты выбрал бы для посадки на клумбу:

А) Яркие красивые растения, которые не требуют особого ухода?

Б) Растения, за которыми необходимо постоянно следить и ухаживать?

- Как ты думаешь, что ты можешь сделать для охраны природы:

А) Ничего, я еще маленький.

Б) Не сорить, не обижать животных, вешать кормушки, собирать мусор в лесу.

Интерпретация данных:

Высокий уровень (3балла). Ребенок осознанно на первое место ставит ин

тересы природы. Полными предложениями отвечает на поставленные вопросы. Проявляет интерес к вопросам. Интересуется охраной природы и бережным отношением к ней.

Средний уровень (2 балла). Ребенок отвечает на поставленные вопросы. Не проявляет особого интереса к бережному отношению, природой больше интересуется с эстетической точки зрения.

Низкий уровень (1 балл) Ребенок затрудняется отвечать на поставленные вопросы. Больше занимают свои интересы, а не вопросы охраны природы. Интересуется красотой природы, а не чистотой.